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Formalism has a bad name. It is often seen as a naïve and 
unsophisticated approach to the adjudication of legal disputes. This 
negative view of formalism is widespread in American legal culture and 
has been particularly influential in contract law. This Article challenges 
this prevailing view and argues that a formalist theory of adjudication is 
the best approach to resolve contractual disputes.  
The argument of this Article starts from the assumption that contract 
law is not morally justified because of its enforcement of promissory rights 
or some other dimension of interpersonal morality. Instead, like 
contemporary law and economics, this Article assumes as its starting point 
that the law of contracts is an instrumentally justified legal institution (i.e., 
an institution justified because of its valuable social consequences). 
Starting from this assumption, this Article asks what approach to the 
adjudication of contractual disputes facilitates the achievement of 
contract law’s instrumental goals. Against the common assumption, the 
answer is that a formalist approach—the specific contours of which are 
set out below—would be instrumentally best. This is because formalism, 
with its commitment to an ex-post, rule-bound, doctrinalist, and modest 
approach to legal adjudication, has important instrumental benefits. 
Formalism contributes to simple, generalizable, and cost-effective 
decision-making; it is consistent with the institutional competence of 
courts; reduces the risks and overall costs of legal mistakes; and increases 
predictability, protecting contractual parties’ legitimate expectations. 
Moreover, formalism is an adequate means to deal with value pluralism 
and is consistent with the main values served by the law of contracts, such 
as autonomy and efficiency.  
Thus, encouraging judges to make socially optimal decisions in 
contractual disputes might not be the optimal strategy. The overall 
socially optimal outcome might, instead, be achieved through a decision 
procedure that directs judges to decide by applying pre-existing doctrine 
and expanding it incrementally. If that is the case, then, despite their 
disagreement about contract law’s foundations, instrumentalist and 
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formalist theorists might agree about the narrower question of how judges 
should decide contractual disputes. 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Formalism “has a bad name.”1 The label invites associations with the 
exploitation of the weak by powerful commercial interests,2 as well as with a naïve 
and mythological view of legal institutions.3 In contract law, specifically, formalism 
has been commonly seen as a set of “ivory tower abstraction[s]”4 and “mystical 
absolute[s].”5 Its defenders feel compelled to explain why it is not a “[s]tupid 
[t]hing.”6  
Thus, labeling something—a form of legal reasoning, a theory of adjudication, 
an approach to statutory interpretation, or an interpretive account of the law—as 
formalistic is a dismissive gesture, a warning sign that tells us we are better off not 
wasting our time. As the saying goes, at least in American legal academia, “we are 
all realists now,”7 and an important part of being a realist is thinking that legal 
materials do not determine case outcomes. The actual work, or so we are told, is 
always done by policy.8 
This Article defies this trend and marks a departure from the conventional 
wisdom. It argues for formalism as the best normative theory of contract law 
adjudication.9 It attempts to show, in other words, that things go better if we actually 
                                                   
1 P.S. Atiyah, Form and Substance in Contract Law, in ESSAYS ON CONTRACT 119 
(1990). See also Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L. J. 509, 509 (1988) (noting that, 
“[w]ith accelerating frequency, legal decisions and theories are condemned as ‘formalist’ or 
‘formalistic’”); Martin Stone, Formalism, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE 
AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 166 (Jules Coleman & Scott Shapiro eds., 2004) (highlighting that 
“few terms have been used more often to criticize legal thought and practice”). 
2 See, e.g., Morton J. Horwitz, The Rise of Legal Formalism, 19 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 
251, 251 (1975) (discussing the change in the legal system from an “expression of the moral 
sense of the community” to an entity that serves commercial interests). 
3 Or, using Cohen’s language, with “transcendental nonsense.” Felix S. Cohen, 
Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809, 811 
(1935). 
4 GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 18 (1995) (regarding classical contract 
theory). 
5 Id. at 98. 
6 See Paul Troop, Why Legal Formalism Is Not a Stupid Thing, 31 RATIO JURIS 428, 
428 (2018). 
7 Joseph William Singer, Legal Realism Now, CALIF. L. REV. 465, 467 (1988). 
8 Edward B. Rock, Corporate Law Doctrine and the Legacy of American Legal 
Realism, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 2019, 2021 (2015) (noting that when gaps in legal materials are 
identified, we ask and are expected “to articulate the ‘policy’ considerations that explain” 
legal outcomes).  
9 Theories of adjudication can be positive or normative. A positive theory of 
adjudication attempts to explain how judges in fact decide cases. A normative theory is 
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ask judges not to resort to policy when deciding contractual disputes, but to instead 
apply the law. Given formalism’s disrepute in American legal culture,10 as well as 
how little has been done to identify the precise target of the criticisms, a fully 
articulated description and a robust defense of formalism are crucial. This Article 
attempts to be a contribution, focused specifically on contract law, in both of these 
respects: it sets out the specific features of a formalist theory of adjudication and 
offers a normative argument for its implementation in contractual disputes.  
As will become clear below, formalism has a certain resemblance,11 in its 
operation, to the non-instrumental views of private law theorists like Ernest 
Weinrib12 and Peter Benson.13 However, unlike Weinrib and Benson, in this Article 
I start from a thoroughly instrumentalist justification of contract law. Thus, the 
Article assumes a very different view about contract law’s foundations and their 
relationship to contract law adjudication.14 Moreover, formalism is not based on 
philosophically thick commitments. It does not rest on a Kantian reconstruction of 
private rights or on an elucidation of the conditions that allow for the reciprocal 
freedom of purposive agents. Instead, it coheres with the more traditional, bread-
and-butter approach of the doctrinal lawyer, who aspires to achieve systematicity 
and coherence at a much lower level of abstraction, and whose tools are not found 
in the philosophy of Kant or Hegel, but in the precedents, doctrines, and treatises of 
the law of contracts. The question, then, is whether this less philosophically 
ambitious theory of adjudication is normatively desirable. Thus, while the complete 
                                                   
concerned with how judges ought to decide cases—how they should use legal reasons and 
materials in the justification of their decisions. Brian Leiter, Rethinking Legal Realism: 
Toward a Naturalized Jurisprudence, 76 TEX. L. REV. 267, 295 (1997); Lewis A. Kornhauser 
& Lawrence G. Sager, Unpacking the Court, 96 YALE L. J. 82, 110 n.37 (1986). 
10 P.S. ATIYAH & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, FORM AND SUBSTANCE IN ANGLO-AMERICAN 
LAW: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LEGAL REASONING, LEGAL THEORY, AND LEGAL 
INSTITUTIONS 29 (1991) (noting that “the term ‘formalism’ is today often used in American 
and, to a lesser extent, in English legal writing and legal theory, to refer to such vices as 
conceptualism, over-emphasis on the inherent logic of legal concepts, the over-
generalization of case-law, and the like”). 
11 But see Part III.F.  
12 See, e.g., Ernest J. Weinrib, Punishment and Disgorgement as Contract Remedies, 
78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 55 (2003) (discussing the limits that the internal justificatory structure 
of private law places on contract remedies). 
13 See, e.g., Peter Benson, Abstract Right and the Possibility of a Nondistributive 
Conception of Contract: Hegel and Contemporary Contract Theory, 10 CARDOZO L. REV. 
1077, 1079–80 (1989) (arguing for an autonomous, internalist, and non-distributive 
conception of the law of contracts); Peter Benson, Contract as a Transfer of Ownership, 48 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1673, 1673–74 (2006). 
14 See generally Felipe Jiménez, Two Questions for Private Law Theory, (Univ. of So. 
Cal. Gould Sch. of Law 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=34529 
09 [https://perma.cc/8AFN-8J2W] (arguing that private law theory ought to separate 
questions about the foundations of private law from questions about the adjudication of 
private law disputes). 
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clarification of formalism as an approach and the normative argument for it will rest 
on philosophical considerations, the approach itself is not philosophically ambitious. 
This, as will become clearer below, is a feature, not a deficit.  
Precisely because formalism is unashamedly doctrinal, it is also distinct from 
the interpretive textualism of Scalia15 and its staunch preference for rules as opposed 
to standards.16 While formalism is sympathetic to the value of rules in the cost-
effective resolution of easy cases and recommends limiting attention to semantic (as 
opposed to pragmatic) considerations in adjudication, it also acknowledges the need 
for adjudicating hard cases and for the incremental development of law beyond the 
pure semantic meaning of legal materials. In this aspect, the notion of legal 
principles, as I will explain below,17 plays a crucial role.  
Formalism is thus neither metaphysical nor textualist. And it rests on a 
normative argument about what approach to contract law adjudication would make 
things go best. Because of this, the question this Article asks is the following: If 
contract law is morally valuable and politically justified because of its good social 
effects, such as its contribution to market exchange and economic efficiency, how 
should judges decide contractual disputes? The answer is that they should follow a 
formalist theory of adjudication such as the one presented in this Article. Thus, this 
Article describes formalism as a theory of adjudication, setting out its main features, 
and offers a normative argument in favor of its use as the appropriate approach to 
contract law adjudication. 
I will begin by clarifying the precise meaning of formalism and setting out its 
specific features—for now, a concise idea will suffice: formalism recommends 
applying the limitedly enriched literal meaning of the legal rules and doctrines of 
contract law and their settled doctrinal construction, without directly considering the 
instrumental purposes of contract law. Thereafter, I will argue that 
instrumentalists—those who, like law and economics scholars, believe that contract 
law’s value derives from its contribution to social welfare18—should see formalism 
as the appropriate approach to the adjudication of contractual disputes. Indeed, 
formalism is a decision procedure that, in the long run, and given the current state 
of the law of contracts, maximizes the instrumental efficacy of contract law.19 The 
reasons underlying this claim, as I will explain, are connected to several of 
formalism’s advantages, including that it contributes to simple, generalizable, and 
cost-effective decision-making; it is consistent with the institutional competence of 
courts; it reduces the risks and overall costs of legal mistakes; and it increases 
predictability, protecting contractual parties’ legitimate expectations. Moreover, 
formalism is an adequate means to deal with value pluralism and is consistent with  
 
                                                   
15 See generally, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE 
INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS (2012). 
16 See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 
(1989). 
17 See infra Part V. 
18 See, e.g., LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE (2006). 
19 See infra Part VI.  
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the main values plausibly served by the law of contracts, such as autonomy and 
efficiency. Thus, we are not all realists now; nor should we be.  
Part II of the Article describes the instrumentalist starting point of my 
argument, as well as some of the argument’s additional assumptions. Part III states 
and describes the main structural features of formalism as a theory of adjudication, 
focusing particularly on its operation in routine or easy cases. Because questions 
about the right normative theory of adjudication are comparative, Part IV offers a 
brief sketch of some possible alternative theories. Part V moves on to describe 
formalism’s operation in hard cases, and how a formalist theory of adjudication can 
make sense of the idea of adjudication as application of pre-existing law even in 
such cases. Part VI supplements the description of formalism with actual examples 
from contract law. Part VII contains the normative argument for formalism and 
offers a series of instrumentalist considerations in favor of its use as the best 
approach towards the adjudication of contractual disputes. Finally, the conclusion 
refers to the comparative advantages of formalism over other theories of 
adjudication, and argues that, because of these advantages, instrumentalist and non-
instrumentalist scholars could agree at the level of adjudication about the value of a 
formalist approach, despite their deeper disagreements about contract law’s 
normative foundations. 
 
II.  PREMISES 
 
A.  An Instrumentalist View of Contract Law’s Foundations 
 
The disagreement between non-instrumentalist and instrumentalist views of 
contract law is a disagreement about its value. Non-instrumentalist conceptions see 
contract law as valuable because of its recognition of private individuals’ power to 
form and change their legal relations.20 Contract law, under these accounts, reflects 
a certain “morality of interpersonal interaction.”21 An instrumental view of contract 
law, on the other hand, claims that the moral justification of contract law is given by 
its valuable social consequences. The justification of contract law does not lie in the 
moral dimension or juridical structure of private interaction, but rather in the social 




                                                   
20 Peter Benson, Contract, in A COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL 
THEORY 29, 37 (Dennis Patterson ed., 1996) (noting that autonomy theories—which 
constitute an instance of non-instrumentalist theories—“view contract law as a legal 
institution that recognizes and respects the power of private individuals to effect changes in 
their legal relations inter se, within certain limits”). 
21 ARTHUR RIPSTEIN, PRIVATE WRONGS xi (2016). 
22 See Liam Murphy, The Practice of Promise and Contract, in PHILOSOPHICAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF CONTRACT LAW 151, 153–54 (Gregory Klass et al. eds., 2014). 
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example of an instrumentalist perspective. Instrumentalism, however, is also 
compatible with a more pluralistic account of the foundational goals of contract 
law.23 
The starting point of my argument is, in this sense, instrumentalist. Of course, 
not everyone agrees with the instrumentalist view of contract law. But it is, at least, 
a prima facie plausible view about the practice. My focus here is not, however, the 
ultimate moral foundation of contract law. Instead, I pursue a second-order question. 
If one thinks that contract law’s best justification is instrumental, what would that 
fact entail for the approach we should use to adjudicate contractual disputes? While 
many theorists are instrumentalists when it comes to both contract law’s foundations 
and to contractual adjudication,24 it is not evident that the instrumentally best 
strategy for adjudicating contractual disputes is itself instrumental. An 
instrumentalist justification of contract law is compatible with a non-instrumentalist 
approach to adjudication. Indeed, it is perfectly feasible to disentangle the 
justification of a legal practice and the justification of actions and decisions within 
it.25 And, if my normative argument proves persuasive, an instrumentalist view of 
contract law might require a non-instrumentalist theory of adjudication.  
I am not the first to suggest an instrumentalist argument for a formalist 
approach to contract law. There is a growing neo-formalist revival in contract law,26 
particularly in the work of legal economists.27 But my argument is different from 
                                                   
23 My view includes contract law’s contribution to the development and sustainment of 
markets and their economic effects, but also other goals, such as the expansion of personal 
autonomy, and the advancement of a modest—yet important—conception of social equality. 
24 See generally, e.g., Richard Posner, Pragmatic Adjudication, in THE REVIVAL OF 
PRAGMATISM: NEW ESSAYS ON SOCIAL THOUGHT, LAW, AND CULTURE 235 (Morris 
Dickstein ed., 1998). 
25 See generally John Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64 PHIL. REV. 3 (1955) (showing 
the importance, for moral theories, of distinguishing between justifying a practice and 
justifying a particular action falling under it); see also Lewis A. Kornhauser, Preference, 
Well-Being, and Morality in Social Decisions, 32 J. LEGAL STUD. 303, 326 (2003). 
26 See generally David Charny, The New Formalism in Contract, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 
842 (1999) (identifying a formalist trend in contract theory); Mark Movsesian, Formalism in 
American Contract Law: Classical and Contemporary, 12 IUS GENTIUM 115 (2006) 
(distinguishing between classical and more recent versions of formalism in contract 
doctrine); John Murray, Contract Theories and the Rise of Neoformalism, 71 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 869 (2002) (characterizing recent contract theory as “neoformalist”). 
27 See, e.g., Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code’s 
Search for Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765 (1996); Lisa Bernstein, The 
Questionable Empirical Basis of Article 2’s Incorporation Strategy: A Preliminary Study, 66 
U. CHI. L. REV. 710 (1999) [hereinafter Bernstein, Article 2’s Incorporation Strategy]; Curtis 
Bridgeman, Why Contracts Scholars Should Read Legal Philosophy: Positivism, Formalism, 
and the Specification of Rules in Contract Law, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1443 (2008); 
JONATHAN MORGAN, CONTRACT LAW MINIMALISM: A FORMALIST RESTATEMENT OF 
COMMERCIAL CONTRACT LAW (2013); Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory 
and the Limits of Contract Law, 113 YALE L. J. 541 (2003) [hereinafter Schwartz & Scott, 
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these views in at least three differences from those of such scholars. The first 
difference is that, while neo-formalists usually restrict the scope of their arguments 
to contracts between sophisticated firms, my argument provides an account that aims 
to be applicable to all types of contractual disputes. The second difference is that, 
while I also start from an instrumentalist perspective, I remain open about the precise 
identity of contract law’s goals and would hold a more pluralistic view of them. In 
my view, the valuable social effects of contract law are diverse and irreducible to a 
single metric of efficiency. The third difference is that my focus is not on the 
interpretation of contracts, but on the interpretation of contract law (i.e., not on 
contracts as instruments used between private parties, but on contract law as the set 
of legal rules governing such instruments).28 
Regardless of these differences, the central claim of this Article is consistent 
with the general spirit of the neo-formalist approach: the best way for contract law 
to achieve its instrumental goals is by not pursuing them directly.  
 
B.  Some Additional Assumptions 
 
Before making the normative argument, let me state the additional 
assumptions—beyond the instrumentalist starting point—that I make in this Article.  
First, I ignore collegiality. Against actual reality, I will assume that all courts 
are composed of one single judge. By making this assumption, I am able to ignore 
the complexities of collegial judicial decision-making,29 which arguably complicate 
any plausible theory of adjudication given the possibility of internal disagreement 
and the need for collective deliberation.  
Second, I assume that whatever theory of adjudication is best should be—and 
will be—implemented in a coordinated way. In other words, I assume that an 
attractive theory of adjudication should be suitable for implementation by a 
multiplicity of judges; and that, as a matter of fact, at any given moment only one 
theory of adjudication will be followed by all judges.  
Third, I assume that a theory of adjudication should apply primarily to cases 
that fall under the broad terms of pre-existing legal materials (e.g., statutes, judicial 
                                                   
Contract Theory]; Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Interpretation Redux, 119 
YALE L. J. 926 (2010) [hereinafter Schwartz & Scott, Contract Interpretation Redux]; Robert 
E. Scott, The Case for Formalism in Relational Contract, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 847 (1999). 
28 On the distinction, see Lewis Kornhauser & W. Bentley MacLeod, Contracts 
Between Legal Persons, in THE HANDBOOK OF ORGANIZATIONAL ECONOMICS 918 (Robert 
Gibbons & John Roberts eds., 2012). See also Menachem Mautner, A Justice Perspective of 
Contract Law: How Contract Law Allocates Entitlements, 10 TEL AVIV U. STUD. L. 239, 240 
(1990). 
29 See generally Lewis Kornhauser, Modeling Collegial Courts. II. Legal Doctrine, 8 J. 
L. ECON. & ORG. 441 (1992) (describing the problems and complexities that collegiality may 
generate for judicial decision-making procedures). 
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opinions, and administrative regulations).30 This assumption helps me to clarify how 
the theory of adjudication applies to most routine cases, and to address its operation 
in hard cases only once we have a clear grasp of how it routinely operates to address 
“everyday” contractual disputes.31  
The fourth assumption I make is that the theory of adjudication will be applied 
in the present circumstances of contract law, as it exists in most liberal Western 
jurisdictions, such as the U.S., Germany, or England. Thus, I would readily accept 
that, in different historical circumstances (e.g., when the common law of contracts 
was starting to develop) and economic or sociocultural conditions, a very different 
theory from the one I propose might be the most attractive approach.  
Finally, I assume that a normative theory of adjudication has two (artificially 
separated) components: interpretation and construction. Interpretation is the 
determination of the communicative content (i.e., the linguistic meaning) of legal 
materials.32 The task of interpretation requires determining what a certain legal 
material means. Construction is the determination of the legal implications (i.e., 
legal rules, doctrines, rights, and obligations) that derive from those legal 
materials.33 The task of construction requires determining what the legal impact of 
those materials is. Importantly, the determination of the legal implications might 
simply consist of replicating the meaning of the legal materials, applying it to the 
case at hand, or might instead translate it into more complex forms of legal doctrine. 
 
                                                   
30 Formalism does not presuppose a specific view about the concept of law. It assumes 
a thin and common-sense view of what types of texts and artifacts constitute legal materials 
(i.e. a more or less minimal and pre-theoretical account of what counts as law, such as the 
one that both positivists and non-positivists might share as the minimal social conditions of 
legal validity, or of what counts as the relevant coordination artifacts that a theory of 
adjudication should take into account). 
31 Thus, I try to avoid the fixation with hard cases that characterizes a lot of 
contemporary legal thinking. See Frederick Schauer, Easy Cases, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 399, 
407 (1985) [hereinafter Schauer, Easy Cases] (with reference to contemporary constitutional 
theory). 
32 I use the term “interpretation,” thus, in a wide sense, not exclusively restricted to 
cases of semantic vagueness or unclear meaning.  
33 In making these distinctions, I follow Edwin W. Patterson, The Interpretation and 
Construction of Contracts, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 833, 833–35 (1964); Lawrence B. Solum, 
The Interpretation-Construction Distinction, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 95, 103–08 (2010) 
[hereinafter Solum, The Interpretation-Construction Distinction]; Lawrence B. Solum, 
Communicative Content and Legal Content, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 479, 480–84 (2013); 
Peter M. Tiersma, The Ambiguity of Interpretation: Distinguishing Interpretation from 
Construction, 73 WASH. U. L. Q. 1095, 1097 (1995). For an excellent analysis in contract 
law, see generally Gregory Klass, Contracts, Constitutions, and Getting the Interpretation-
Construction Distinction Right, 18 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y (forthcoming 2020) (discussing 
the distinction and relationship between interpretation and construction in contract and 
constitutional theory). 
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III.  FORMALISM, DEFINED 
 
There are several forms of formalism,34 and the recent literature characterizes 
formalism in different ways.35 Because of this, any argument about formalism 
should clarify what it means by the term.36 By formalism, I mean a theory of 
adjudication that recommends a strict adherence to the literal meaning (limitedly 
enriched by public facts about the historical context and other objective features that 
determine meaning) of the legal rules and doctrines of contract law and their settled 
doctrinal construction, without directly considering the instrumental purposes of 
contract law. This entails that formally applicable legal rules and their 
accompanying doctrines should not be set aside by judges to achieve contract law’s 
goals. Thus, formalism demands taking communicative content as mostly 
determined by literal meaning, with very limited consideration of pragmatic and 
contextual elements. It also requires constructing the legal upshots of literal 
meaning—its legal content—taking into consideration only that narrowly construed 
meaning and its settled doctrinal interpretation.   
Given the main features of the theory of adjudication I defend, the term 
‘formalism’ is an apt label. Still, I do not attempt to defend the theory as the best 
version of formalism, an account of the necessary and sufficient conditions of the 
concept, or its historically accurate reconstruction. The label captures the central 
tenets of the theory of adjudication I will defend. But one should not read too much 
into the label. The central normative claim of this Article is for the theory of 
adjudication to be adopted, not for the appropriateness of the label I use to designate 
it.  
To flesh out in more detail what I mean by formalism, the rest of this part sets 
out the central traits of the theory: retrospectivity, rule-boundedness, decisional 
restriction, doctrinalism, and nuanced literalism. 
 
A.  Retrospectivity 
 
Retrospectivity means that the adjudicator’s decision should look backwards; 
it should focus on past events as the basis for their decision. This trait of formalism 
is opposed to the ex-ante perspective characteristic of consequentialist decision-
                                                   
34 Richard H. Pildes, Forms of Formalism, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 607, 607 (1999). 
35 According to Brian Leiter, formalism is characterized by two traits: it sees law as 
“rationally determinate,” and adjudication as autonomous from non-legal normative 
reasoning. Brian Leiter, Legal Formalism and Legal Realism: What Is the Issue?, 16 LEGAL 
THEORY 111, 111 (2010). See also Larry Alexander, “With Me, It’s All er Nuthin’”: 
Formalism in Law and Morality, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 530, 531 (1999); Schauer, supra note 1, 
at 510; Henry E. Smith, The Language of Property: Form, Context, and Audience, 55 STAN. 
L. REV. 1105, 1112 (2003). 
36 As noted by BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, BEYOND THE FORMALIST-REALIST DIVIDE: THE 
ROLE OF POLITICS IN JUDGING 160 (2009). 
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making.37 Retrospectivity demands courts to take an ex-post orientation to determine 
the rights and duties of the parties.38 The role of the judge is to decide cases by 
applying the preexisting legal materials to the dispute at hand, without resorting to 
prospective considerations. 
 
B.  Rule-Boundedness 
 
Under formalism, judges should treat the available legal materials and doctrine 
as providing and establishing serious rules (rules applying and giving a solution to 
all cases that fall under their terms) governing their decisions, which should be 
applied without further inquiry into goals and consequences.39  
Rule-boundedness is not conceptually necessary. It is part of a normative theory 
of adjudication. Thus, rule-boundedness does not rest on a conceptual claim about 
legal rules being determinate,40 exclusionary,41 leading to all or nothing 
application,42 etc. On the contrary, there are different ways to justify decisions and 
actions on the basis of rules,43 and the very same legal texts may be treated 
differently by interpreters. Different legal systems and cultures may approach the 
interpretation of their rules—and even of the same rules, in the case of legal 
transplants—in different ways.44 If rules are treated as exclusionary reasons, this is 
because of the interpreter’s approach, and not because of their “ruleness.”45 Thus, 
one should not assume that legal rules necessarily lead to formalistic application, 
                                                   
37 For Jody Kraus, the preference for an ex ante or an ex post approach to adjudication 
is one of the fundamental methodological disagreements between what he calls economic 
and deontic theories. Jody S. Kraus, Philosophy of Contract Law, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE & PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 687, 701–03 (Jules L. Coleman, 
Kenneth Einar Himma & Scott J. Shapiro ed. 2004). 
38 Benson, supra note 20, at 52. 
39 On the idea of a “serious rule,” see Alexander, supra note 35, at 541. 
40 Cf. Id. at 544. 
41 Cf. JOSEPH RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS 73–76 (1999). 
42 Cf. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 24 (1977) (arguing that “[r]ules 
are applicable in an all-or-nothing fashion”). Thus, for all his criticism of the model of rules, 
Dworkin saw rules exactly as his positivist opponents saw them. See Timothy Endicott, Are 
There Any Rules?, 5 J. OF ETHICS 199, 201–04 (2001). 
43 Thus, here I depart from Rawls’s analysis in Rawls, supra note 25, at 4 (arguing that 
one must distinguish “between the justification of a rule or practice and the justification of a 
particular action falling under it”). 
44 This is clear in comparative law. Comparative analyses do not simply resort to a 
comparison of legal norms, but transcend textual analysis in order to take a broader look at 
the legal culture, and at the way in which lawyers and scholars approach legal materials. See 
generally Mark Van Hoecke & Mark Warrington, Legal Cultures, Legal Paradigms and 
Legal Doctrine: Towards a New Model for Comparative Law, 47 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 495 
(1998) arguing for comparative analysis transcending the surface level of legal rules and for 
a greater engagement with legal culture and legal reasoning.  
45 FERNANDO ATRIA, ON LAW AND LEGAL REASONING 97 (2002). 
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that they apply in an all-or-nothing fashion, etc. It is true, as Rawls claimed, that to 
engage in a practice means to follow its rules.46 However, there are different ways 
of following and applying rules, and the decision regarding how to follow and apply 
them is, in the end, normative.47 The normative force of rules depends, in the end, 
on normative considerations, and not just on their semantic applicability or legal 
validity.48 
Because of this, formalism does not rest on supposedly conceptual 
characteristics of legal rules. Instead, it claims that judges ought to decide cases by 
applying legal rules and doctrines as generally exclusionary and indefeasible 
mandates (i.e., as serious rules), because of the normative considerations supporting 
that approach.  
 
C.  Decisional Restriction 
 
Formalism argues that the adjudication of contractual disputes should be based 
on a limited domain of reasons connected to pre-existing legal materials (i.e. ‘legal 
reasons’). This notion of decisional restriction is connected to the idea that there is 
a limited domain of acceptable arguments in legal discourse, so that not every 
argument counts as an acceptable argument for a particular decision or 
interpretation.49  
Decisional restriction might make the adequate adjudicative decision differ 
from what would be the best all-things-considered decision in the case at hand. Still, 
it is compatible with adjudicative decisions incorporating what Eisenberg calls 
“social propositions,” such as moral norms, policies and experiential 
propositions50—whether such incorporation is dictated by pre-existing legal 
materials or seems necessary given the particularities of the case. The peculiarity is 
that, for being incorporated, such propositions must be formulated in terms of 
criteria that are connected to the pre-existing legal materials.51 They must be justified 
                                                   
46 Rawls, supra note 25, at 26. 
47 Rawls himself acknowledged this. See id. at 29.  
48 Frederick Schauer, Rules and the Rule-Following Argument, 3 CAN. J.L. & 
JURISPRUDENCE 187, 192 (1990) (arguing that “rules do not determine their own 
application”); FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL 
EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE 126 (1991) 
[hereinafter SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES] (arguing that “the process of taking a rule to 
be applicable depends not only on the rule’s own designation of applicability, even 
presupposing internal validity, but of something external to that rule and to the rule-system 
of which it is a part”). See also STANLEY CAVELL, THE CLAIM OF REASON: WITTGENSTEIN, 
SKEPTICISM, MORALITY, AND TRAGEDY 303 (1979). 
49 On the idea of law as a limited domain, see Frederick Schauer, The Limited Domain 
of the Law, 90 VA. L. REV. 1909, 1914–15 (2004). 
50 MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW 14–32 (1988). 
51 GUNTHER TEUBNER, LAW AS AN AUTOPOIETIC SYSTEM 59 (Zenon Bankowski ed., 
Anne Bankowska & Ruth Adler trans., The European University Institute Press Series) 
(1993). 
 
1132 UTAH LAW REVIEW [NO. 5 
“on legal grounds,”52 and be translated into reasons53 that arise from, or can be 
connected to, pre-existing legal materials. 
Note that decisional restriction is possible even if one denies the idea of law as 
a distinct domain, as Dworkin’s one system view—which claims that law rightly 
understood is a subset of political morality54—does, and as some more recent similar 
views, such as Kornhauser’s eliminativism55 and Greenberg’s moral impact theory,56 
do. Under these views, it might at first seem that judges cannot rely on a limited 
domain of legal reasons for their decisions, because what judges ought to do is 
underdetermined by legal materials. The theory of adjudication, under this view, is 
a freestanding decision procedure, and governs how judges should decide cases 
without any need for first finding out “what the law is.”57 The existence of legal 
materials is just one of the relevant facts to be taken into consideration when 
deciding a particular dispute.  
I am skeptical about the relevance of jurisprudence for normative theories of 
adjudication: at least, it is not necessary for judges to have a philosophical theory 
about the content and the grounds of law in order to fulfil their role as adjudicators.58 
However, even assuming that the jurisprudential views of Dworkin, Kornhauser or 
Greenberg are right, and that jurisprudence has a bearing on adjudication, decisional 
restriction is still possible. Indeed, a normative theory of adjudication is a moral 
argument about how judges ought to decide cases. This means that, as a moral 
argument, it takes into consideration all the relevant concerns that Dworkin and 
Greenberg claim are part of legal decision-making. Moreover, a normative theory of 
adjudication is precisely what Kornhauser’s eliminativism requires. If the case for 
formalism is morally sound, then one can perfectly say, with Dworkin and 
Greenberg, that the moral impact of legal materials is given by the limitedly enriched 
semantic content of legal materials and their settled doctrinal construction, because 
this is the morally adequate effect that said materials have on our moral obligations.59 
And, with Kornhauser, one could claim that decisional restriction does not derive 
from the concept of law, but simply from the right account of how judges should 
decide cases—though, admittedly, in such a case decisional restriction would not 
                                                   
52 JAN M. SMITS, THE MIND AND METHOD OF THE LEGAL ACADEMIC 61 (2012). 
53 See Frederick Schauer, Is the Common Law Law?, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 455, 462 (1989) 
(noting the possibility of translation of “social” propositions into “legal” propositions). 
54 See RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS ch. 19 (2011). 
55 See generally Lewis A. Kornhauser, Doing Without the Concept of Law (N.Y. Univ. 
Sch. of Law, Working Paper No. 15–33, 2015). For criticism, see LIAM MURPHY, WHAT 
MAKES LAW: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 88–102 (2014). 
56 See generally Mark Greenberg, The Moral Impact Theory of Law, 123 YALE L.J. 
1288 (2014). 
57 Kornhauser, supra note 55, at 3. 
58 MURPHY, supra note 55, at 8. 
59 Of course, Dworkin and Greenberg would disagree with this view about the moral 
impact of legal materials. They would reject decisional restriction. But this is a substantive 
disagreement that we might have even within the one-system framework they prefer. 
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refer to “legal” reasons, but to reasons “extracted from the limited domain of 
relevant legal materials.”60 While formalism’s talk of “legal materials” and “legal 
reasons” is apt to make this point, the point can also be made without any reference 
to the legal character of those materials and reasons (i.e., without assuming a definite 
concept of law that is necessarily independent from moral considerations).61 
 
D.  Doctrinalism 
 
Formalism is not just about legal materials. It is also about legal doctrine. Legal 
doctrine is the construction of the legal implications of legal rules and materials by 
past judges and scholars, using a specifically juristic approach.62 At least in 
American legal academia, this approach has been increasingly decaying.63 
Formalism goes against this trend. 
A doctrinalist approach attempts to achieve the explanation and systematization 
of contract law from an internal perspective. Here, ‘contract law’ is understood as 
the content and reasons derived from legal materials and their correct interpretation. 
Doctrine should be built based on such materials.64  
This point about legal materials as the starting point of doctrinalism is worth 
emphasizing and explaining further. Formalism is premised on a strong distinction 
between justifying legal norms and applying them.65 Doctrinalism is, in this sense, 
an internal perspective66 that provides an internal justification (i.e., a justification for 
particular decisions as application of pre-existing legal norms).67 It places a big 
emphasis on conceptual elaboration and classificatory taxonomy,68 and on the 
                                                   
60 This brings home Murphy’s point about how artificial and full of paraphrases our 
discourse about law becomes if we accept eliminativism. MURPHY, supra note 55, at 90, 99. 
61 Again, formalism rests on a thin and common-sense view of what types of texts and 
artifacts count as legal materials, and because it does not rely on a specific jurisprudential 
view about the grounds of law, it is compatible with seeing those past “legal” materials as 
the relevant past authoritative decisions or the relevant coordination artifacts that a theory of 
adjudication should consider (in case one prefers to take a one-system or eliminativist view 
of the concept of law). Nothing of substance, in the end, turns on whether we call these 
reasons and materials “legal”—I simply prefer these terms rather than the more convoluted 
terms the eliminativist would.  
62 SMITS, supra note 52, at 7. 
63 Richard Posner, The Decline of Law as an Autonomous Discipline: 1962–1987, 100 
HARV. L. REV. 761 passim (1987). 
64 ALEKSANDER PECZENIK, ON LAW AND REASON 274 (2008). 
65 See KLAUS GÜNTHER, THE SENSE OF APPROPRIATENESS: APPLICATION DISCOURSES 
IN MORALITY AND LAW 248, 256 (1993) see generally Rawls, supra note 25. 
66 SMITS, supra note 52, at 20. 
67 AULIS AARNIO, REASON AND AUTHORITY: A TREATISE ON THE DYNAMIC PARADIGM 
OF LEGAL DOGMATICS 189 (1997). 
68 A relevant example of this emphasis on classification and taxonomy in the common 
law is the work of Peter Birks. See generally PETER BIRKS, UNJUST ENRICHMENT (2005) 
(arguing for the relevance of taxonomy in the law of unjust enrichment); PETER BIRKS, THE 
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artificial maps69 developed by judges and legal writers that provide a reconstruction 
of legal concepts and their mutual relationships.  
Doctrinalism thus understood finds its models in the work of classical German 
jurists, such as Savigny,70 and less recently, in the work of the late scholastics.71 
Doctrinalism also fits comfortably with the classical legal treatise or textbook and is 
consistent with the traditional approach of the American Law Institute’s 
Restatements.72 It is a key feature of the traditional common law approach, which 
has allowed it to endure, as Balganesh and Parchomovosky put it, “over time and 
context, and in the face of changing social values and preferences.”73 Because of 
this, doctrinalism is not just the work of scholars, although it does see the upshots of 
legal materials as partly determined by their work.74 Doctrinal categories, 
taxonomies, and concepts are also—and in some cases, mostly—derived from the 
work of judges, particularly (or perhaps, more evidently) in common law systems.75 
 
E.  Nuanced Literalism 
 
In terms of the distinction between communicative content and legal content, 
formalism claims that (i) the communicative content of legal texts should be derived 
from their semantic content, with limited contextual and pragmatic additions; and  
 
 
                                                   
ROMAN LAW OF OBLIGATIONS (Eric Descheemaeker ed., 2014) (offering a taxonomy of the 
Roman law of obligations). 
69 Alan Watson, Artificiality, Reality and Roman Contract Law, 57 TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR 
RECHTSGESCHIEDENIS 147, 147 (1989). 
70 SMITS, supra note 52, at 16–17; KAIUS TUORI, ANCIENT ROMAN LAWYERS AND 
MODERN LEGAL IDEALS: STUDIES ON THE IMPACT OF CONTEMPORARY CONCERNS IN THE 
INTERPRETATION OF ANCIENT ROMAN LEGAL HISTORY 59 (2007). 
71 On the late scholastics, see Helge Dedek, The Splendour of Form: Scholastic 
Jurisprudence and Irrational Formality, 5 LAW & HUMAN. 349 (2011) (offering an analysis 
of the connections between contemporary legal discourse and Scholastic jurisprudence); 
JAMES GORDLEY, THE PHILOSOPHICAL ORIGINS OF MODERN CONTRACT DOCTRINE (1993) 
[hereinafter GORDLEY, MODERN CONTRACT DOCTRINE] (offering a reconstruction of 
contract law on the basis of the work of the late scholastics); JAMES GORDLEY, FOUNDATIONS 
OF PRIVATE LAW: PROPERTY, TORT, CONTRACT, UNJUST ENRICHMENT (2006) (offering a 
theory of private law based on the work of classical jurists, including the late scholastics).  
72 See Richard A. Posner, Legal Scholarship Today, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1314, 1317 
(2001). 
73 Shyamkrishna Balganesh & Gideon Parchomovsky, Structure and Value in the 
Common Law, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1241, 1243 (2015). 
74 See Rodolfo Sacco, Legal Formants: A Dynamic Approach to Comparative Law 
(Installment II of II), 39 AM. J. COMP. L. 343, 346–48 (1991) (analyzing legal scholarship as 
a “legal formant” or a source of law). 
75 See JOHN MERRYMAN & ROGELIO PÉREZ-PERDOMO, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION: AN 
INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA ch. 6 (3d. 2007).  
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(ii) the legal implications of those texts should be determined by applying this 
communicative content along with their settled doctrinal construction to the case at 
hand.  
When scholars and practitioners discuss what a certain legal text “means,” they 
refer to diverse things such as literal meaning, contextual meaning, intended 
meaning, etc.76 Semantic content is the most basic building block of meaning. It is 
determined by the semantics and syntax of the relevant expression.77 Thus, semantic 
content is settled by the lexical meaning of the words used and the sentence’s 
syntactic structure.78 It is, in brief terms, the artificially isolated linguistic meaning 
of the text.79 One level up the ladder is assertive content, which considers the specific 
context in which the semantic content was issued or uttered,80 and the specific 
content that the speaker or issuer intended to communicate.81  
Of course, there is a gap between semantic content and legal content—between 
what the text’s literal meaning communicates and the legally correct answers. Thus, 
I agree with the claim that, in principle, “literal meaning cannot be decisive of what’s 
legally correct.”82 But I agree only in principle, since there might sometimes be good 
normative reasons to make what’s legally correct a reflection of literal meaning. This 
is precisely what the normative argument for formalism claims should happen in 
easy cases. However, in many circumstances judges will need to make certain 
assumptions about the contexts in which the legal materials were enacted or issued 
in order to unpack their communicative content.83 I also accept that context might 
play a semantic role, supplying additional information to that derived exclusively 
from literal meaning.84 Finally, under formalism, public facts about “the relevant 
                                                   
76 Richard H. Fallon, The Meaning of Legal “Meaning” and Its Implications for 
Theories of Legal Interpretation, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 1235, 1239 (2015) (noting that “in 
claiming what a statutory or constitutional provision means, judges, lawyers, and scholars 
often invoke or refer to what I characterize as its literal or semantic meaning, its contextual 
meaning as framed by the shared presuppositions of speakers and listeners, its real 
conceptual meaning, its intended meaning, its reasonable meaning, or its previously 
interpreted meaning”). 
77 Andrei Marmor, Can the Law Imply More than It Says? On Some Pragmatic Aspects 
of Strategic Speech, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF LANGUAGE IN THE LAW 83, 84 
(Andrei Marmor & Scott Soames eds., 2011). 
78 ANDREI MARMOR, THE LANGUAGE OF LAW 22–23 (2014). 
79 Solum, The Interpretation-Construction Distinction, supra note 33, at 98. 
80 Marmor, supra note 78, at 84. 
81 Greenberg, supra note 56, at 1292. 
82 Brian Flanagan, Revisiting the Contribution of Literal Meaning to Legal Meaning, 
30 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 255, 256 (2010). See also Mark Greenberg, The Standard 
Picture and Its Discontents, in OXFORD STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 39, 42 (Leslie 
Green & Brian Leiter eds., 2011). 
83 As suggested by John Searle, Literal Meaning, 13 ERKENNTNIS 207, 207 (1978). 
84 Jason Stanley & Zoltán Gendler Szabó, On Quantifier Domain Restriction, 15 MIND 
& LANG. 219, 229 (2000). 
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context and the relevant legal background”85 have a role in enriching semantic 
content. Thus, formalism advocates a nuanced form of literalism, which gives salient 
relevance to semantic meaning but does not require inferring meaning exclusively 
from semantic content in every possible instance. This semantic content might be 
enriched by narrow context (i.e., by “matters of objective fact to which the 
determination of the semantic contents of certain expressions are sensitive,”86) as 
well as by limited pragmatic considerations. 
Formalism also admits that even this enriched literal meaning can be 
insufficient to determine the meaning of an authoritative legal text fully and 
univocally.87 But formalism is not just committed to nuanced literalism. Its elements 
operate jointly, and thus doctrinalism plays a crucial role in determinatively 
specifying the legal implications of ambiguous or equivocal legal materials. 
Semantic meaning does not exhaust the extension of doctrinal concepts. On the 
contrary, the legal culture’s use of those concepts constitutes a “specialized usage”88 
which helps determine that extension. This means that semantic content, under 
formalism, is doctrinally enriched. The semantic content of legal materials might be 
incomplete and vague, but legal doctrine also governs formalist adjudication.89 
Formalism is thus, primarily, a doctrinalist position. It sees the importance of 
semantic meaning and the value of restricting contextual and pragmatic 
considerations for settling the communicative content of legal materials. At the same 
time, it replaces a stubborn attachment to texts with a more nuanced attention to the 
ways in which these texts are enriched by the conceptual taxonomies and systematic 
relationships between legal concepts and doctrines that characterize our legal 
practices.  
 
F.  Corrective Justice? 
 
Formalism presents certain similarities to some existing non-instrumental 
views of contract law adjudication. For instance, the ideas of decisional restriction 
and retrospectivity seem particularly consistent with corrective justice perspectives 
in private law.90 Because of this, it might be useful to clarify the relationship between 
the two views.  
                                                   
85 MARMOR, supra note 77, at 115. 
86 Kent Bach, Context Dependence, in THE BLOOMSBURY COMPANION TO THE 
PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE 153, 156 (Manuel García-Carpintero & Max Kölbel eds., 2014). 
87 See MARMOR, supra note 78, at 83–84 (underlining the limitations of semantic 
content). 
88 Balganesh & Parchomovsky, supra note 73, at 1257. 
89 Troop, supra note 6, at 434. 
90 See generally, e.g., Weinrib, supra note 12 (offering a corrective justice view of 
contract remedies); ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW (2012) [hereinafter 
WEINRIB, PRIVATE LAW] (arguing that private law is an autonomous, non-instrumental 
practice supported by its own rationality based on notions of Kantian right and corrective 
justice). 
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Corrective justice is the form of justice that rectifies inequalities in 
interpersonal transactions.91 As a form of justice, corrective justice stands in contrast 
to distributive justice, which deals with the distribution of goods and burdens across 
society.92 The judge’s role when adjudicating a contractual dispute, under a 
corrective justice view, is simply to grant a remedy that rectifies the breach of 
contractual duty.93 
Formalism, on my account, achieves something akin to corrective justice, 
rectifying breaches of contract through the strict application of the remedial rules 
and doctrines of contract law. Crucially, however, it is legal corrective justice, not 
natural corrective justice, that is being achieved.94 The baseline for rectification is 
not provided by corrective justice as an abstract principle of interpersonal morality, 
but by the legal rules themselves. The same can be said of the remedial response that 
restores the promisee to that baseline.  
Moreover, while Weinrib and others are right when they highlight the bipolar 
and retrospective features of private law adjudication,95 they get things backwards, 
in my view, when they assume that these features can also be a self-standing 
justification of private law. Indeed, although judges are crucial institutional agents 
in private law, what they do (or ought to do) is not the whole story about private law. 
Unjustifiably, corrective justice scholars universalize the institutional position of the 
judge, transforming it into the whole justificatory theory of private law. The mistake 
is to assume that, since the judge should only consider reasons of corrective justice, 
it must be the case that private law is justified only on the basis of corrective justice. 
On the contrary, the fact that a judge should only consider a limited type of reasons 
for her decision does not mean that these are the only reasons in favor or against 
such decision.96 There is no justification for assuming that the reasons that should 
be relevant to one particular institution exhaust the reasons justifying or explaining 
the practice that institution is a part of. In fact, we might have very good reasons for 
judicial decisions to be motivated by the rectification of the breach of legal rights by 
private parties, and not by the underlying goals of contract law. But transforming 
the theory of adjudication into the whole justificatory structure underlying private 
law and contract law is unwarranted. Thus, although formalism presents some 
similarities with corrective justice, the starting point and foundations of the two 
theories are extremely different. 
 
                                                   
91 JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 178 (1980). See also Ernest J. 
Weinrib, Corrective Justice in a Nutshell, 52 U. TORONTO L.J. 349, 349 (2002) 
(characterizing corrective justice as the rectification of interpersonal injustice). 
92 See FINNIS, supra note 91, at 166. 
93 See WEINRIB, PRIVATE LAW, supra note 90, at 136–40. 
94 See Jeremy Waldron, Does Law Promise Justice, 17 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 759, 773 
(2001) (making the distinction between legal and natural corrective justice). 
95 See WEINRIB, PRIVATE LAW, supra note 90, at ch. 5.  
96 See John Gardner, The Purity and Priority of Private Law, 46 U. TORONTO L.J. 459, 
463–64 (1996). 
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IV.  ALTERNATIVE THEORIES 
 
From an instrumentalist perspective, the question about the correct approach 
towards the adjudication of contractual disputes is comparative. An instrumentalist 
argument in favor of a theory of adjudication depends on the assessment of its costs 
and benefits,97 as compared to feasible alternatives, all of which turns on empirical 
facts.  
This empirical assessment, however, is not the path pursued here. While, 
admittedly, a definitive instrumentalist defense of formalism requires this empirical 
evaluation, the claim is more limited: there are generally good instrumental reasons 
to assume a formalistic approach in the adjudication of contractual disputes. The 
balance of considerations makes formalism the most plausible candidate as the 
correct theory. This approach is compatible with empirical evidence having the final 
say. In the absence of such evidence, my claim is that we have generally good 
reasons to strive for a much more constrained approach to the adjudication of 
contractual disputes.  
But, again, evaluating such reasons turns on the alternatives. For such purposes, 
this part of the Article presents a sketch of some stylized normative theories of 
adjudication that might serve as comparative benchmarks: conventionalism, 
pragmatism, and interpretivism. My account is partly based on Dworkin’s taxonomy 
of rival conceptions of law in Law’s Empire.98 However, I treat each of these theories 
as a normative theory of adjudication, and my own reconstruction departs in 
important respects from Dworkin’s characterization. Also, while in each case I refer 
to the work of several theorists, I should not be interpreted as claiming that, for 
instance, Hart or Raz are conventionalists in the terms in which I define the term. 
What I am trying to do is to capture, by drawing a somewhat impressionistic picture, 
some familiar and plausible ways of approaching what judges should do when 
adjudicating contractual disputes, in order to later contrast these potential 
approaches with formalism. 
 
A.  Conventionalism 
 
Conventionalism is arguably the standard lay view of adjudication. It is the 
view that underlies judicial nomination processes and much of the opposition to 
judicial activism and “legislation from the bench.” Conventionalism claims that 
judges ought to decide cases by applying pre-existing valid legal rules independently 
of their normative desirability, whenever those rules give a clear answer to the case 
at hand.99 In such cases, one could say, the case belongs to the core of the valid legal 
                                                   
97 See LARRY ALEXANDER & EMILY SHERWIN, DEMYSTIFYING LEGAL REASONING 42-
50 (2008) (offering a cost-benefit comparison of different approaches to common law 
reasoning). 
98 RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE (1986) [hereinafter DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE]. 
99 Id. at 114–74. 
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rule. Legal validity, on the conventionalist picture, rests on social facts, like social 
conventions or legal officials’ practices,100 such as Hart’s rule of recognition.101 In 
other cases, belonging to the penumbra of legal rules, judges should engage in 
interstitial and discretional law-making, but their activity in such cases should be 
constrained by the existing legal rules to some extent.102 Thus, conventionalism does 
not endorse judicial discretion as synonymous to caprice,103 since unregulated cases 
are governed by laws that guide and constrain what judges can do. But after that 
general guidance, judges do need to make choices among the possible solutions.104  
In terms of the key features of formalism that I identified above, 
conventionalism is similar to formalism in its analysis of easy cases belonging to the 
core of legal rules. It is consistent with retrospectivity. It also sees adjudication as 
rule-bound. It also accepts a thin and limited version of decisional restriction, in the 
sense that judges should apply valid legal sources in easy cases. In hard cases, 
however, judges should make new law, relying on moral and other non-legal 
considerations,105 and partly on existing law. Conventionalism is not evidently 
committed to doctrinalism. In fact, it might be inconsistent with some of its aspects, 
such as systematicity (i.e., the view of legal norms as part of a complex system of 
interconnected concepts and institutions).106 Finally, it is not necessarily committed 
to nuanced literalism (though it might be), because it is compatible with different 
ways of determining the communicative content of legal texts.  
Conventionalism is, however, committed to a certain view about the connection 
between communicative and legal content: identity. The rules to apply are whatever 
norms are to be found in the legal materials. And the rules coincide with actual 
sentences and utterances in legal texts.107 For conventionalism, once the 
communicative content of legal texts has been figured out, there is nothing left for 
                                                   
100 Id. at 114–15. 
101 See H. L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 100–110 (1994). 
102 See generally Joseph Raz, The Inner Logic of the Law, in ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC 
DOMAIN: ESSAYS IN THE MORALITY OF LAW AND POLITICS 249 (1995) (arguing that the 
exercise of judicial discretion is directed and subject to specific duties). On the distinction 
between core and penumbra, see generally H. L. A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of 
Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593 (1957); see also HART, supra note 101, at 124–154.  
103 See Joseph Raz, Legal Principles and the Limits of Law, 81 YALE L. J. 823, 847–48 
(1972) (arguing that judicial discretion is different from arbitrary judgment). 
104 See JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW AND MORALITY 181 
(1979). 
105 Id. at 49–50. 
106 See generally Jeremy Waldron, “Transcendental Nonsense” and System in the Law, 
100 COLUM. L. REV. 16 (2000) (arguing in support of systematicity and its technical 
vocabulary). 
107 Although such utterances need not be taken in isolation from their context and may 
be “pragmatically enriched.” Andrei Marmor, The Pragmatics of Legal Language, 21 RATIO 
JURIS. 423, 423 (2008). 
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the judge to do—if she is to act as a judge—but apply it.108 On the other hand, if 
there is no communicative content, there is no legal content: for conventionalism, 
there is no law apart from the communicative content derived from authoritative 
sources.109 Here is, again, where discretion comes in. This, as I will expand upon 
later, has important implications—and marks an important difference with 
formalism—in the treatment of hard cases. 
 
B.  Pragmatism 
 
Pragmatism as a theory of adjudication (which is not necessarily connected to 
philosophical pragmatism)110 claims that judges ought to come up with optimal 
decisions, all-things-considered, without regard to consistency with past decisions, 
as an end in itself.111 The pragmatic judge does see legal materials, as Posner argues, 
as potentially valuable sources of information.112 Thus, pragmatism does not entirely 
ignore legal constraints. From a pragmatist perspective, moreover, judges ought to 
consider the systemic consequences of their decisions,113 and take into account the 
values of continuity, coherence, impartiality, and predictability—but as values 
always open for tradeoffs.114 Thus, because of the evident beneficial consequences 
of rules, a pragmatic judge should sometimes decide cases quickly, on the basis of 
legal materials’ plain meaning.115 But this is always for each judge to decide on her 
own. When deciding a case, the judge must try to compare the benefits of adherence 
to legal materials to the costs of failing to innovate when the decisions recommended 
by the legal materials are inadequate.116 Posner’s suggestion about how to strike this 
balance is telling: “make the most reasonable decision you can, all things 
considered.”117  
In terms of the key features of formalism that I identified above, pragmatism 
decidedly rejects all of them. Its rejection is not an absolute one, since pragmatism 
might recommend deciding some cases using formalist techniques, and hence 
                                                   
108 Thus, according to conventionalism, “the primary way in which law is determined 
is that the linguistic content of a legally authoritative pronouncement becomes a legal norm 
simply because it was authoritatively pronounced.” Greenberg, supra note 82, at 54. 
109 DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 98, at 116–17. 
110 Matthew H. Kramer, The Philosopher-Judge: Some Friendly Criticisms of Richard 
Posner’s Jurisprudence, 59 MOD. L. REV. 465, 475–76 (1996).  
111 Posner, supra note 24, at 238. 
112 See id. 
113 RICHARD POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY 59 (2003) [hereinafter 
POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY]. 
114 Id. at 60–61. 
115 Id. at 62–63. 
116 See id. at 63–64. In this aspect, pragmatism advocates something along the lines of 
what Alexander and Sherwin call a “natural model” of decision-making. See ALEXANDER & 
SHERWIN, supra note 97, at 39. 
117 POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY, supra note 113, at 64. 
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adhering to those features. However, this can only be decided case-by-case by the 
pragmatist judge. For instance, a pragmatic judge might recognize that legal doctrine 
plays a relevant role in generating expectations and facilitating commerce.118 But 
her deference to doctrine is not decided ex ante and across the board, as formalism 
suggests, but in each particular case. In fact, as Posner’s own recent characterization 
of his work as a judge shows, a much cruder approach to adjudication, under which 
legal materials provide few constraints, might be compatible with pragmatism.119 
 
C.  Interpretivism 
 
Interpretivism defends several claims about the role of judges. For example, 
interpretivism claims that, when adjudicating, judges must have at least an implicit 
theory about the point of legal practice as a whole, about the goal or principle that 
best justifies it.120 Additionally, according to interpretivism, the correct underlying 
theory is that legal practice secures a form of equality among citizens and morally 
justifies the exercise of political power. This general purpose of law leads to the 
view that the legal rights and obligations of parties follow not just from authoritative 
sources, but also from the moral and political principles presupposed by those 
sources as their best possible justification.121 
The adjudicative approach advocated by interpretivism has three steps. First, 
the judge identifies a set of legal materials that might apply to the case at hand.122 
Second, she must construct a justification that fits most of those legal materials and 
shows them in their best light, as expressing a coherent conception of justice.123 
Third, she must adjust her pre-interpretive view considering that justification, 
discarding some of the presumptively applicable materials as “mistake[s].”124 
Judges, under this view, enforce the rights of citizens as they flow from past political 
decisions and their best justification. Adjudicative decisions are, figuratively 
speaking, a part of a long novel written by different authors.125 The best justification 
of the previous chapters determines whether a proposition of law is true or false.126 
In summarized terms, judges ought to decide cases in ways which are consistent 
                                                   
118 Id. at 95. 
119 “‘I pay very little attention to legal rules, statutes, constitutional provisions,’ Judge 
Posner said. ‘A case is just a dispute. The first thing you do is ask yourself—forget about the 
law—what is a sensible resolution of this dispute?’” Adam Liptak, An Exit Interview with 
Richard Posner, Judicial Provocateur, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 11, 2017), https://www.nytimes. 
com/2017/09/11/us/politics/judge-richard-posner-retirement.html [https://perma.cc/Q96U-
G3HH]. 
120 DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 98, at 87–88. 
121 Id. at 95–96. 
122 Id. at 65–66. 
123 Id. at 66. 
124 Id. 
125 Id. at 228–32. 
126 See id. at 225–26. 
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with the principles that morally justify legal practices. These principles allow for the 
resolution of hard cases. 
In terms of the key features of formalism, interpretivism accepts complex 
versions of some of them and rejects others. Generally, under interpretivism, 
interpretation is connected to large issues of moral and political theory that transcend 
the relationship between the parties and the limited domain of contract law. 
Retrospectivity is relevant for interpretivism, in its account of the relevance of past 
political decisions.127 Interpretivism rejects rule-boundedness because it places a big 
emphasis on principles of political morality. It also rejects decisional restriction, 
since judges ought to decide cases based on eminently normative considerations. 
Regarding doctrinalism, the taxonomies and classifications of legal doctrine are, for 
interpretivism, a matter of local priority. Thus, they might be relevant if they track 
the right moral principles, but the judge might suggest their modification when this 
is what best coheres with the justification of legal practice.128 Finally, interpretivism 
rejects nuanced literalism, since the best interpretation of legal practices might 
recommend deciding in ways which are inconsistent with the limitedly enriched 
literal meaning of legal texts.  
However, the most important divergence between interpretivism and formalism 
is connected to their treatment of hard cases. I turn to this issue in the next part. 
 
V.  HARD CASES AND DEVELOPING THE LAW 
 
Judges, particularly in common law systems, change the law while applying 
it.129 Sometimes, they go beyond the texts of legal materials, generating new 
solutions to hard cases, developing the law by adapting it to changing circumstances. 
These innovations may expand or contract the presumptive scope of application of 
legal materials,130 as a means to achieve adequate outcomes in legal adjudication.  
Formalism is not just a theory about easy cases, and it has the resources to guide 
judicial development in hard cases—without endorsing judicial legislation.131 On the 
contrary, under formalism, the development of law might still count as applying the 
law.132  
                                                   
127 Id. at 227–28. 
128 See id. at 250–54 (describing the doctrinal compartmentalization of law). 
129 See Gerald J. Postema, Philosophy of the Common Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK 
OF JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 588, 588–89 (Jules Coleman & Scott J. 
Shapiro eds., 2002); FREDERICK SCHAUER, THINKING LIKE A LAWYER 112–17 (2009). 
130 MATTHIAS KLATT, MAKING THE LAW EXPLICIT: THE NORMATIVITY OF LEGAL 
ARGUMENTATION 5 (2008). 
131 See id. at 4–15 (discussing the contrast between judicial legislation and judicial 
development, highlighted by the German doctrine of the wording of the statute). 
132 Despite the talk of “applying the law” that will characterize a lot of this part of my 
argument, what I mean by this expression is just the idea of applying the pre-existing legal 
materials. This is consistent, as I have said above, with an eliminativist or one-system 
jurisprudential view.  
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It is important to note that, for some cases to be hard, there must be a significant 
proportion of easy cases (i.e., cases that can be solved by adjudicators by simply 
applying the semantic content of the relevant legal materials and their related 
doctrines). The distinction between hard and easy cases depends on acknowledging 
the existence of both types.133 Arguably, easy cases constitute the core of contract 
law adjudication. Of course, it is easy to understand why legal theorists tend to focus 
on hard cases decided by appellate courts. But, pace Dworkin, hard cases are not the 
most common instance.134 Still, any plausible theory of adjudication should be able 
to account for hard cases, even if they are not as important or common as they 
sometimes seem.  
There are two ways in which a case might be hard. First, it may be unclear what 
the communicative content of a legal rule is, either because the relevant legal 
materials are semantically obscure, or because they simply remain silent on the case 
at hand. Second, it might be that the communicative content is clear, but its 
application to the case at hand is inconsistent with the purposes of contract law.135 
In the first case, adjudicative institutions need to make a decision even though there 
is no clear answer provided by legal materials; in the second, there is a clear answer, 
but the answer is inadequate. I call the first type of case a semantically hard case, 
and the second type a normatively hard case.136 Thus, we can build the following 






Unclear Answer Unacceptable 
Answer No Answer 
 
In a case of Unclear Answer, it is uncertain what the communicative content 
derived from legal materials is. This might be because of the unclear meaning of an 
expression or its vagueness,137 or because legal materials contain different 
propositions with inconsistent implications. In a case of No Answer, there is simply 
no proposition in the legal materials that is applicable to the case at hand. Finally, in 
the case of Unacceptable Answer, there is no question about the semantic content, 
                                                   
133 In all of this, of course, I am presupposing that rules are semantically autonomous 
from their underlying justifications. Otherwise, there could not be any possible conflict 
between the rule and its justification. (All cases would be easy.) See ANDREI MARMOR, 
INTERPRETATION AND LEGAL THEORY 153 (2d ed., Hart Pub. 2005); see also Ángeles 
Ródenas, En La Penumbra: Indeterminación, Derrotabilidad y Aplicación Judicial de 
Normas, 24 DOXA 63, 72–73 (2001) (Spain). 
134 See Schauer, Easy Cases, supra note 31, at 407. 
135 See Manuel Atienza & Juan Ruiz Manero, Rules, Principles, and Defeasibility, in 
THE LOGIC OF LEGAL REQUIREMENTS 238, 243 (Jordi Ferrer Beltrán & Giovanni Battista 
Ratti eds., 2012); see also Stone, supra note 1, at 179.  
136 For a similar taxonomy, see Stone, supra note 1, at 179.  
137 See Schauer, Easy Cases, supra note 31, at 405–06. 
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but the application of that semantic content to the case is normatively 
unacceptable.138  
Legal principles are the main mechanism that formalism proposes to address 
these cases. This mechanism is connected to the doctrinalist perspective of 
formalism and allows judges to apply legal materials beyond their literal scope, or 
to avoid the application of prima facie applicable materials to a particular case. One 
might say, following Savigny, that in the first case, communicative content is simply 
indefinite, and legal principles determine and refine that relatively inchoate meaning 
into determinate legal content, and that, in the second, the communicative content is 
definite but erroneous because it diverges from “the actual thought of the law.”139 In 
the latter case, legal principles correct the communicative content for the purpose of 
constructing legal content.  
The notion of the actual thought of the law as a guiding (albeit metaphorical) 
criterion shows that a judge can admit the existence of normatively hard cases and 
the need to solve them satisfactorily without endorsing discretion or ceasing to apply 
the law. Indeed, the same reasons that might lead to an insistence on a rule-bound 
approach to adjudication would continue to exist in hard cases. Once the legal 
materials run out, or we are persuaded that their application provides an evidently 
inadequate answer, there is no transformation in the role that judges ought to have. 
It is not the case that, beyond legal materials, the judge is left with nothing but 
“policy.”140 Hard cases should not lead to an abandonment of the commitments that 
underlie the adjudication of easy cases. If there are good reasons for formalism in 
the routine operation of contract law adjudication, those reasons subsist in hard 
cases.  
Still, hard cases do require a certain movement beyond legal materials and 
towards normative foundations. Precisely, under formalism, legal principles play a 
mediating function between legal materials and their underlying instrumental 
justification. In this way, they allow for deciding hard cases taking into account their 
peculiarity, but consistently with the rest of the theory of adjudication. Importantly, 
these principles are legal principles—not in the theoretically ambitious sense that 
they are “part of the law,” but in the more mundane sense that they are connected to 
pre-existing legal materials. 
The use of the term legal is also important because it highlights a distinction 
between formalism and Dworkin’s interpretivism. Interpretivism also uses 
principles as means to address hard cases.141 Under formalism, however, even 
though legal principles relate to the underlying justifications of contract law,142 they 
                                                   
138 Id. at 415–16. 
139 FRIEDRICH CARL VON SAVIGNY, SYSTEM OF THE MODERN ROMAN LAW 179, 186 
(William Holloway trans.) (1867). 
140 Stone, supra note 1, at 192. 
141 See DWORKIN, supra note 42, at 81. 
142 See EISENBERG, supra note 50, at 80. 
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are not coextensive with them. They are internal or mid-level principles143 that don’t 
justify contract law, but rather are themselves justified by the underlying purposes 
of the practice, occupying a middle ground between the latter and authoritative legal 
materials. For instance, the principle of good faith, which has been understood as 
implicit in Article 1134 of the French Code Civil and has been recognized in 
American law by the Restatement,144 can be appealed to directly by a judge in order 
to adjudicate a hard case. However, good faith is not a consideration that justifies 
the whole practice of contract law, but a principle that is internal to the practice and 
simultaneously mediates between the internal discourse of contract doctrine and the 
instrumental purposes that underlie it.145 The formalist conception of legal principles 
is thus similar to the notion of regulae iuris (i.e., of statements or maxims that 
systematize parts of the legal system).146 These principles are implicit in legal 
materials, and are not a mere matter of substantive justice or social morality; they 
are indissolubly connected to authoritative legal sources.147 In contrast, for Dworkin, 
a principle “is a requirement of justice or fairness or some other dimension of 
morality.”148 While Dworkinian principles are most naturally understood as 
wholesale, foundational principles of political morality, formalist principles are 
internal, mid-level, and legal. 
There is a second crucial difference. Interpretivism understands principles in 
opposition to instrumental goals or policies. While principles stand for requirements 
of justice or political morality,149 policies stand for the advancement of collective 
goals.150 Only the former, and not the latter, should guide adjudication.151 Under 
formalism, on the other hand, legal principles mediate between the available legal 
materials and their instrumental justifications, and are themselves part of an 
instrumental social practice. They are indissolubly connected to policy 
considerations (even if they do not coincide with them).  
                                                   
143 Cf. Michael D. Bayles, Mid-Level Principles and Justification, 28 NOMOS 49, 49–
50 (characterizing the notion of mid-level principles); Kenneth Henley, Abstract Principles, 
Mid-Level Principles, and the Rule of Law, 12 LAW & PHIL. 121, 122 (1993) (building on 
Bayles’s work to argue that “mid-level principles serve to promote the rule of law”). 
144 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (AM. LAW INST. 1981). 
145 Here, I follow Fernando Atria, Jurisdicción e Independencia Judicial: El Poder 
Judicial Como Poder Nulo, 5 REV. ESTUDIOS DE LA JUSTICIA 119, 120–21 (2004) (Chile); 
Fernando L. Atria, La Relevancia Del Derecho Civil (a Propósito de Barros, Tratado de 
Responsabilidad Extracontractual), 8 REV. ESTUDIOS DE LA JUSTICIA 219, 225–26 (2006) 
(Chile).  
146 Manuel Atienza & Juan Ruiz Manero, Sobre Principios y Reglas, 10 DOXA 101, 105 
(1991) (Spain). See also PETER STEIN, REGULAE IURIS: FROM JURISTIC RULES TO LEGAL 
MAXIMS (1966). 
147 Id. at 112.; see also Graham Virgo, Doctrinal Legal Research, in THE NEW OXFORD 
COMPANION TO LAW 339, 339–40 (Peter Cane & Joanne Conaghan eds., 2008). 
148 DWORKIN, supra note 42, at 22. 
149 Id. 
150 Id. at 82. 
151 Id. at 84. 
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How do legal principles operate, according to formalism? First, they expand 
the communicative content of existing legal materials to cover new cases, in the 
circumstances of No Answer. Second, they guide the construction of the legal 
content of legal materials whose communicative content is unclear, in cases of 
Unclear Answer. In these two types of situations, in which legal principles operate 
similarly to analogies,152 linguistic indeterminacy need not lead to legal 
uncertainty.153 Third, legal principles restrict the application of prima facie 
applicable legal materials in cases of Unacceptable Answer. In this latter situation, 
principles lead to defeasibility (a familiar version of which is distinguishing a 
precedent):154 legal norms are subject to implied exceptions which have not been 
specified ex ante,155 and which reduce their scope of application.156 In these three 
cases, legal principles constitute mechanisms for the construction of legal content in 
hard cases. 
Legal principles are already present in contemporary legal systems. A basic 
interpretive principle in many of them is that every behavior not expressly mandated 
or prohibited is allowed.157 While some have seen this standard as a “closure rule” 
that shows the inexistence of gaps “when the law is silent,”158 I think it is rather a 
principle mediating between rules and considerations of political morality. In any 
case, the example is useful because it shows how gaps in the communicative content 
of legal materials do not imply that judges should make law.159  
There are also examples of legal principles working like this in contract law. I 
return to good faith, a general principle recognized by most American 
jurisdictions.160 Although good faith has been criticized for its open-ended character, 
                                                   
152 For an analysis of analogy along similar lines, see NEIL MACCORMICK, RHETORIC 
AND THE RULE OF LAW: A THEORY OF LEGAL REASONING 206 (2009); see also RAZ, supra 
note 104, at 180–209. 
153 Balganesh & Parchomovsky, supra note 73, at 1272. 
154 See Riccardo Guastini, Defeasibility, Axiological Gaps, and Interpretation, in THE 
LOGIC OF LEGAL REQUIREMENTS 182, 188 (Jordi Ferrer Beltrán & Giovanni Battista Ratti 
eds., 2012). 
155 Juan Carlos Bayón, Why Is Legal Reasoning Defeasible?, 2 DIRITTO & QUESTIONI 
PUBBLICHE 1, 11 (2002) (It.). 
156 Guastini, supra note 154, at 188. 
157 See HANS KELSEN, INTRODUCTION TO THE PROBLEMS OF LEGAL THEORY: A 
TRANSLATION OF THE FIRST EDITION OF THE REINE RECHTSLEHRE OR PURE THEORY OF LAW 
85 (1997). 
158 See, e.g., RAZ, supra note 104, at 75–77. 
159 David Lyons, Open Texture and the Possibility of Legal Interpretation, 18 LAW & 
PHIL. 297, 300–02 (1999). 
160 See Steven J. Burton, Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty to Perform in 
Good Faith, 94 HARV. L. REV. 369, 369 (1980) (noting that most American jurisdictions 
recognize the duty to perform in good faith as a general principle); U.C.C. § 1-203 (AM. LAW 
INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1977) (recognizing the obligation of good faith in the 
performance and enforcement of all contracts); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 
205 (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (same). 
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it has been able to accommodate different normative commitments while 
maintaining a stable “jural meaning,”161 as a standard of contract interpretation and 
an implied covenant in every contract.162 In both cases, good faith acts as an open-
ended placeholder which “serves to exclude many heterogeneous forms of bad 
faith.”163 Because of this open-ended character, the principle of good faith needs to 
be disciplined, and—as legal principles in general, according to formalism—
specified and articulated into specific criteria of application164 through doctrinal 
construction, both by courts and scholars. As Summers has argued, this is precisely 
what has happened in the case of good faith.165 As a consequence, judges applying 
the principle have meaningful guidance, and they do not simply make new law.166 
On the contrary, they are able to effectuate the intention of the parties and protect 
their reasonable expectations,167 doing justice “according to law.”168 The principle 
of good faith, moreover, when recognized by the Second Restatement, was based on 
pre-existing legal materials, such as judicial opinions, statutory developments, and 
doctrinal scholarship.169 However, good faith goes beyond these legal materials, 
connecting them to the instrumental foundations of contract law, policing 
advantage-taking170 and allowing for voluntary cooperation between strangers.171 
To contemporary ears, the idea that even when judges develop the law or devise 
creative solutions to legal problems—they still resort to pre-existing legal sources—
might sound strange. It certainly contrasts with the commonplace observation that 
                                                   
161 Balganesh & Parchomovsky, supra note 73, at 1246–47. 
162 Burton, supra note 160, at 371. 
163 Robert S. Summers, “Good Faith” in General Contract Law and the Sales 
Provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. REV. 195, 196 (1968). 
164 See Robert S. Summers, The General Duty of Good Faith—Its Recognition and 
Conceptualization, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 810, 820 (1981) (suggesting a need for judges to 
“try to articulate criteria to be used to decide whether particular conduct claimed to be in bad 
faith really is so”). 
165 Id. at 822 (explaining how doctrinal and judicial developments have led to the 
formulation of more determinate criteria and application contexts for the duty of good faith 
the formulation of “lists of criteria” by judges and scholars, and the “accumulation of 
experience with respect to some contexts,” are all examples of ways in which “good-faith 
law” is becoming fully formed). 
166 See id. at 823–24 (discussing the steps judges can take in novel cases posing an issue 
of good faith under the Restatement (Second) of Contracts in order to ensure predictability 
and uniformity in the application of law). 
167 Burton, supra note 160, at 371. 
168 Summers, supra note 163, at 198. 
169 See id. at 812 (explaining that the “accumulation of case law imposing a duty of 
contractual good faith outside contexts of ‘good-faith purchase’ was considerable” at the 
time Restatement (Second) of Contracts was being drafted). 
170 See Daniel Markovits, Good Faith as Contract’s Core Value, in PHILOSOPHICAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF CONTRACT LAW 272, 275 (Gregory Klass et al. eds., 2014). 
171 See id. at 292–93. 
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judges legislate interstitially and at least sometimes make law,172 and with the 
common ridicule that is usually attached to the ‘declaratory theory of law,’173 which, 
in Lord Reid’s words, was nothing but a fairy tale.174 
Of course, there is an obvious sense in which judges do make law, all the time. 
Sometimes legal materials fail to provide answers. Sometimes they provide unclear 
or unacceptable answers. In these cases, judges go beyond those materials. But there 
is also an important truth in the notion that, even in such cases, judges “declare the 
law.”175 Indeed, the slogan can be seen as a vindication of the incrementalist and 
minimalist character of the common law.176 
This is not just a change in the language we use to describe what is going on. 
Because formalism is committed to doctrinalism, the use of the word declaration is 
also the claim that the communicative content of legal materials does not exhaust 
the restricted domain of reasons that the judge can consider in making her 
decision.177 This helps to explain why formalism places such a big emphasis on 
doctrinal construction. Unlike the ‘scarecrow’ versions of formalism we are used to, 
the theory of adjudication this Article argues for understands that adjudication 
involves much more than the syllogistic application of legal rules or their blind 
application despite changing social circumstances. Instead, it admits that 
adjudication involves complex processes and should allow for contract law to 
develop, claiming nevertheless that this should not mean giving up on legal 
formality—and the advantages that, as I will argue, it possesses. Formalism values 
legal formality, and its reliance on conceptual stability and doctrinal tradition, 
precisely as a means to allow for change “with minimal structural disruption.”178 
 
VI.  EXAMPLES 
 
Up to this point, I have set out the main features of formalism and its 
commitments, as well as its operation in hard cases. I have also explained how legal 
                                                   
172 As Justice Holmes noted in S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 221 (1917). 
173 For critical analysis, see generally Allan Beever, The Declaratory Theory of Law, 
33 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 421 (2013) (defining the declaratory theory of law and offering 
an argument in its support). 
174 Lord Reid, The Judge as Law Maker, 12 J. SOC’Y PUB. TCHRS. L. 22, 22 (1972). 
175 Martin Krygier, Julius Stone: Leeways of Choice, Legal Tradition and the 
Declaratory Theory of Law, 9 U.N.S.W.L.J. 26, 26–27 (1986). 
176 Balganesh & Parchomovsky, supra note 73, at 1267. 
177 See Beever, supra note 173, at 440. (“All of this is to say that the declaratory theory 
has a serious point. What is the difference between changing the law in a legislative way and 
developing the law by adapting and repairing the law’s seamless web? The answer seems to 
be that a change is a development if it fits within or is somehow guided by consideration of 
the law’s web or mosaic. The law in the relevant respect, then, is not just that which has been 
decided in the relevant cases, it is also to be found in this more abstract picture of a web or 
mosaic.”). 
178 Balganesh & Parchomovsky, supra note 73, at 1247–48. 
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principles and concepts, such as good faith, play a crucial role in formalist 
adjudication. In order to make formalism more concrete, I will focus on a few 
examples of decisions that can be interpreted as deploying a formalist approach to 
contract law adjudication.  
The logical place to start, in my view, is in Cardozo’s contract jurisprudence. 
Indeed, as Corbin noted, one of the central components of Cardozo’s genius was his 
ability to expand contract doctrine without overthrowing old doctrines and 
establishing new ones, striking a balance that allows for the evolution of contract 
doctrine without sudden change,179 molding doctrine without repudiating it.180 
Consistently with Corbin’s views, modern commentators have characterized 
Cardozo’s jurisprudence as a “thickly textured doctrinalism,” which allowed for the 
incremental evolution of the common law.181 Cardozo was able to invoke traditional 
contract doctrine “to reach legal conclusions that others would have been hard 
pressed to see.”182 
An obvious example is Wood v. Lucy, Lady-Duff Gordon.183 In this decision, 
Cardozo found an implied promise to use reasonable efforts—a “forerunner of what 
became the implied duty of good-faith performance.”184 The opinion was an 
extraordinary innovation that kept traditional doctrine congruent with contemporary 
commercial reality.185 What’s remarkable, from a formalist perspective, is that this 
extraordinary innovation was achieved not by imposing an obligation that would 
secure whatever goals Cardozo thought underpinned the law of contracts. Instead, 
Cardozo interpreted the agreement and its context using the traditional tools of 
contract interpretation and old legal standards governing it, such as the notions that 
“[a] promise may be lacking, and yet the whole writing may be ‘instinct with an 
obligation,’”186 that courts “are not to suppose that one party was to be placed at the 
mercy of the other,”187 and that the acceptance of an exclusive agency is an 
assumption of duty.188 
  
                                                   
179 See Arthur L. Corbin, Mr. Justice Cardozo and the Law of Contracts, 52 HARV. L. 
REV. 408, 408–09 (1939). 
180 See id. at 438–39. 
181 Lawrence A. Cunningham, Cardozo and Posner: A Study in Contracts, 36 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 1379, 1381 (1994–1995). 
182 Id. at 1391. 
183 118 N.E. 214 (1917). 
184 Cunningham, supra note 181, at 1397. 
185 Id. 
186 118 N.E. at 214 (quoting McCall Co. v. Wright, 117 N.Y.S. 775, 779 (1909); Moran 
v. Standard Oil Co., 105 N.E. 217, 221 (1914)). 
187 Id. (quoting Hearn v. Charles A. Stevens & Bro., 97 N.Y.S. 566, 570 (1906); Russell 
v. Allerton, 15 N.E. 391, 391 (1888)).  
188 Id. (citing Phoenix Hermetic Co. v. Filtrine Mfg. Co., 150 N.Y.S. 193 (1914); W. G. 
Taylor Co. v. Bannerman, 97 N.W. 918 (1904); Mueller v. Bethesda Mineral Spring Co., 50 
N.W. 319 (1891)).  
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Cardozo’s analysis of consideration and promissory estoppel in Allegheny 
College189 is a less well-known but even better example of the doctrinalist balance 
between change and tradition. In this decision, Cardozo started his analysis by 
claiming that the classical view of consideration as a “detriment to the promisee 
sustained by virtue of the promise . . . is little more than a half truth.”190 Cardozo 
argued that such half-truths can sometimes perpetuate themselves as whole truths, 
as he proceeded to analyze the law governing charitable subscriptions and whether 
their enforcement “can be squared with the doctrine of consideration as qualified by 
the doctrine of promissory estoppel.”191 In his analysis, Cardozo argues: 
 
Decisions which have stood so long, and which are supported by so many 
considerations of public policy and reason, will not be overruled to save 
the symmetry of a concept which itself came into our law, not so much 
from any reasoned conviction of its justice, as from historical accidents of 
practice and procedure. The concept survives as one of the distinctive 
features of our legal system. We have no thought to suggest that it is 
obsolete or on the way to be abandoned. As in the case of other concepts, 
however, the pressure of exceptions has led to irregularities of form.192 
 
Intelligently, Cardozo maintains a balance between the need to maintain consistency 
with the “distinctive features of the legal system” and the very changes and 
irregularities of form that those features undergo as a consequence of the legal 
system’s need to adapt to new realities and resolve gaps and inconsistencies. The 
decision is also noteworthy because Cardozo’s analysis is successful at showing how 
this novel type of situation can be adequately dealt with even “within the mould of 
consideration as established by tradition.”193  
Analyzing this decision, scholars have claimed that the opinion “may be a 
perfect example of common law incrementalism,” in which Cardozo works “closely 
with the legal concept of consideration.”194 In this way, Allegheny College 
“showcases the role that legal concepts play in underwriting the process of 
                                                   
189 With this, I do not mean to suggest that Cardozo’s overall approach towards 
adjudication was formalist in my sense of the term. His decision in Allegheny College is just 
an example of an innovative decision within formalist parameters, even if Cardozo’s overall 
jurisprudence takes a different approach. However, I do think there are certain connections 
between formalism, and particularly formalism in hard cases, and Cardozo’s understanding 
of adjudication. For an overview of that understanding, see generally BENJAMIN N. 
CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921). 
190 Allegheny Coll. v. Nat’l Chautauqua Cty. Bank of Jamestown, 159 N.E. 173, 174 
(1927) (citations omitted). 
191 Id. at 175. 
192 Id. (citations omitted). 
193 Id. 
194 Balganesh & Parchomovsky, supra note 73, at 1269. 
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incremental doctrinal change.”195 In similar terms, Curtis Bridgeman has argued that 
the decision is “subtle and insightful,”196 demonstrating a balance between the 
technical doctrines of contract law and the relevant factual context of the contractual 
relationship—in this case, of charitable subscriptions.197 In this way, Bridgeman 
argues, Cardozo was applying formal rules while, at the same time, being attentive 
to context and to the nuanced variations that are possible within doctrinal 
conceptualism.198 
These features of the Allegheny College decision, along with Wood v. Lucy, are 
an example of Cardozo’s broader jurisprudence, which—while not, strictly 
speaking, formalist—was both innovative and traditional.199 Richard Posner, in his 
book on Cardozo, sometimes claims this was a form of concealment.200 At other 
times, however, he notes that Cardozo’s balanced jurisprudence was an outstanding 
example of common law incrementalism.201 Others, like John Goldberg, claim that 
Cardozo was a sophisticated doctrinalist judge, and one of the most accomplished 
anti-Realist judges of the twentieth century.202 In my view, there is no need to 
adjudicate this dispute one way or the other: the very dispute shows that, in different 
senses, it might very well be the case that Cardozo, at least in Allegheny College, 
was both creating law (since, for him, after all, judge-made law was one of “the 
existing realities of life”)203 and applying it—that he was innovating intelligently 
and with close attention to practical consequences, while making use of the resources 
available in the legal culture and the pre-existing legal materials. And this duality is 
exactly what formalism argues for in hard cases.  
Thus, formalism admits the existence of interstitial law-making authority. 
Moreover, it accepts that in some instances—in hard cases—the exercise of such 
authority is desirable. At the same time, however, formalism stands for the 
proposition that, even in such cases, judges should decide by applying “ascertained 
legal principles . . . according to a standard of reasoning which is not personal to the 
judges themselves,” under the assumption “that there exists a definite system of 
accepted knowledge or thought and that judgments and other legal writings are 
                                                   
195 Id. 
196 Curtis Bridgeman, Allegheny College Revisited: Cardozo, Consideration, and 
Formalism in Context, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 149, 152 (2005). 
197 Id. at 152–53. 
198 Id. at 166–67. 
199 As he wrote: “In this perpetual flux, the problem which confronts the judge is in 
reality a twofold one: he must first extract from the precedents the underlying principle, the 
ratio decidendi; he must then determine the path or direction along which the principle is to 
move and develop, if it is not to wither and die.” CARDOZO, supra note 189, at 28. 
200 See RICHARD A. POSNER, CARDOZO: A STUDY IN REPUTATION 13 (1993). 
201 See id. at 95. 
202 John C.P. Goldberg, The Life of the Law, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1419, 1423 (1999). 
203 CARDOZO, supra note 189, at 10. 
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evidence of its content.”204 In this way, formalism is based on a relevant distinction 
between extending the application of doctrinal principles, developing the law to 
adjust to new realities or to avoid undesirable results, and abandoning the limited 
domain of legal reasons in a pursuit for justice or the instrumental efficacy of 
contract law.205 Judges, under formalism, are supposed to justify their decisions by 
resorting to a limited domain of reasons, whether that is achieved through nuanced 
literalism or through the more creative application of the authorized institutional and 
doctrinal tradition.206  
 
VII.  FORMALISM, DEFENDED 
 
Now let us turn to the normative argument on behalf of formalism. Some 
scholars base formalistic approaches on fidelity to the traditions of the common 
law,207 or on the idea of private law as a self-sufficient justificatory structure.208 The 
argument I will make, however, is based on the idea that formalism, to be plausible, 
should be defended pragmatically rather than on principle, and on the basis of its 
consequences.209 I also avoid defending formalism on the basis of claims about the 
nature of language, interpretation, or law.210 The argument for formalism that this 
Article puts forward depends on the social effects it may have rather than on 
conceptual purity.211 
But how should one assess the consequences of theories of adjudication? For 
the purposes of my argument, I will assume that the best theory of adjudication is 
that which achieves, in the long run, the largest proportion of correct decisions (or, 
conversely, the fewest and least costly mistaken decisions), at the lowest cost 
possible.212 By correct decisions, I mean decisions which, in the aggregate, 
maximize the achievement of contract law’s underlying goals. What’s relevant is 
not whether the theory achieves the correct decision in each specific case, but 
whether the overall result is the best possible balance of correct decisions, incorrect 
                                                   
204 Owen Dixon, Concerning Judicial Method, in JESTING PILATE AND OTHER PAPERS 
AND ADDRESSES 152, 155–56 (1997). 
205 Id. at 158. 
206 Martin Krygier, Law as Tradition, 5 LAW & PHILOS. 237, 245 (1986). 
207 See John Gava, Can Contract Law Be Justified on Economic Grounds?, 25 U. 
QUEENSLAND L.J. 253, 261 (2006). 
208 See generally WEINRIB, PRIVATE LAW, supra note 90. 
209 Cf. Cass R. Sunstein, Must Formalism Be Defended Empirically?, U. CHI. L. REV. 
636, 641 (1999). 
210 Cf. Cass R. Sunstein, There Is Nothing that Interpretation Just Is, 30 CONST. CMT. 
193, 207 (2015). 
211 Cf. Omri Ben-Shahar, The Tentative Case Against Flexibility in Commercial Law, 
66 U. CHICAGO L. REV. 781, 783 (1999) (arguing that formalism can be defended “only if 
the patterns of conduct it brings about are superior . . . to those inspired by a nonformalist 
approach” and if it promotes “mutually beneficial exchanges”). 
212 See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE 
SUPREME COURT 47 (1999) [hereinafter SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME]. 
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decisions, and costs—including both operative costs and total costs of mistakes 
(which are a function of the number of mistaken decisions and their costs). Thus, the 
evaluation is wholesale rather than retail.  
This consequence-based approach towards the justification of formalism has a 
respectable tradition in contract scholarship.213 Think, for instance, of the work of 
Samuel Williston. As Movsesian has argued, Williston’s formalism was not 
essentialist, but was rather based on its practical advantages.214 Formalism, for 
Williston, promoted simplicity and predictability.215 Like Williston, my argument 
starts from the notion that contract law is best justified in terms of instrumental goals. 
From this perspective, adjudication should facilitate the attainment of those goals. 
Because of this, I offer a general argument showing that the balance of reasons 
weighs in favor of formalism in contract law adjudication. This is just a starting point 
that needs to be supplemented with further empirical research.216 But the general 
case is strong, and it highlights the direction in which such empirical inquiry should 
move.217  
My claim, in short, is that allowing judges to always ask the question, ‘Is this 
application of the legal materials and their doctrinal construction sound in 
instrumental terms?’ is not the best path towards the achievement of contract law’s 
goals. Instead, such achievement requires a formalist approach based on treating 
legal materials as providing serious rules,218 and applying those rules by considering 
their semantic content, limitedly enriched by contextual factors, as constructed by 
the doctrinal tradition.  
Under formalism, adjudicative decisions are not fine-grained judgments that 
take into account all the relevant considerations. This means that formalism has 
important costs, and that whatever benefits it may help achieve are obtained at the 
expense of some sub-optimal decisions. But the implementation of any theory of 
adjudication entails tradeoffs.219 In the final analysis, whether one theory of 
adjudication is preferable to another depends on their empirical effects. But in the 
                                                   
213 It has also been acknowledged as a perfectly reasonable approach in the realm of 
general theories of adjudication. Posner, supra note 24, at 236. 
214 Movsesian, supra note 26, at 128. 
215 Mark Movsesian, Rediscovering Williston, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 207, 213 (2005) 
[hereinafter Movsesian, Rediscovering Williston]. 
216 In the end, all theories of adjudication defended in terms of consequences require 
this empirical grounding. See ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN 
INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION 3–5 (2006). 
217 Non-instrumentalist formalists, of course, do not see the need to ask these questions. 
For them, contract law is an immanent justificatory structure. But, from an instrumentalist 
perspective, arguing for formalism, or for any other theory of adjudication for that matter, is 
a matter of overall consequences. 
218 See supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
219 See, e.g., Posner, supra note 24, at 238 (explaining that “[t]here is often a tradeoff 
between rendering substantive justice in the case under consideration and maintaining the 
law's certainty and predictability”). 
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absence of full empirical evidence, there is a strong general case to be made in favor 
of formalism in the adjudication of contractual disputes. Due to the general rejection 
and even ridicule of formalism,220 this general presumptive or prima facie case for 
its use is valuable, and shows that, while the final word pertains to real-world effects 
and empirical evidence, a priori there is no reason to presume formalism would be 
undesirable. On the contrary, there are several reasons that provide strong support 
for the plausibility of a generally formalistic approach to contract law adjudication.  
 
A.  Simplicity, Generalizability, and Reduction of Decision Costs 
 
Tailored and fine-grained decisions may seem ideal at the retail level. 
Particularized and detailed attention to the complexities of each case would arguably 
be the ideal solution if all that mattered was getting it right in the specific case. But 
getting it right in the specific case is not all that matters, particularly if getting it 
right demands decisions the content of which cannot be easily communicated. Fine-
grained approaches to adjudication can present significant communicative costs.221 
The decisions achieved through them might not be effective in guiding citizens’ 
behavior and might increase transaction costs. Formalism may lead to less fine-tuned 
decisions at the retail level, but, at the wholesale level, secures the significant 
advantages of simplicity and generalizability. The messages generated by formalism 
are clear and simple,222 an advantage that is fundamental when communicating legal 
standards to large audiences.223  
Moreover, formalism might be epistemically less demanding than other 
approaches that require more attention to the specific case, such as pragmatism. 
Judges are not capable of taking into consideration all the relevant data that an all-






                                                   
220 See supra notes 1–8 and accompanying text. 
221 Smith, supra note 35, at 1116. 
222 A similar claim in the area of property is made by Smith. Id. at 1108. Importantly, 
Smith draws a contrast between property and contract, particularly in Henry E. Smith, The 
Persistence of System in Property Law, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 2055, 2073 (2015). For him, 
“contract . . . can contain more information, and can even use language idiosyncratic to the 
two parties . . . because, generally speaking, this contract is not relevant to anyone other than 
the parties . . . .” Smith, supra note 35, at 1110. This might be true with regards to the 
interpretation of contractual instruments (though, for reasons similar to those explored here, 
I doubt that is the case), but is certainly not correct regarding the interpretation of contract 
law, which, just like property, establishes general rules and norms which are communicated 
and applied to a wide array of individuals and firms.  
223 Smith, supra note 35, at 1111. 
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decreases the costs of adjudicative decisions, and by taking many (otherwise 
relevant) considerations off the table, allows decision-makers to focus on a limited 
set of relevant considerations in more detail,224 decreasing decisional complexity.225  
Of course, simplicity is not all that matters. But the simplicity achieved by 
nuanced literalism, together with well-designed legal texts and settled, sound 
doctrines, present outstanding benefits. Accuracy is costly.226 Formalism decreases 
such costs and, coupled together with reasonably acceptable rules and doctrines, as 
seems to be the case in contemporary contract law, is more capable of achieving a 
reasonable balance than more particularistic or purposive approaches to 
adjudication, such as pragmatism and interpretivism. 
But for formalism to reduce decision costs, legal rules must be taken as serious 
rules.227 A serious rule “purports to state a prescription applicable to every case that 
falls within the rule’s factual predicate or hypothesis.”228 Accordingly, formalism 
requires judges to apply rules based on their literal meaning, limitedly enriched, and 
as constructed by contract doctrine, without any further consideration into 
underlying purposes. The reason for this is that those underlying considerations are 
very often concealed, and—if contemporary contract theory is a reliable 
indication—their precise identity is unclear. Uncertain conjectures about underlying 
values make decision-making more complex and costlier, while providing limited, 
if any, benefits. Indeed, by their very nature, conjectures can very well be 
substantively mistaken. This is an evident risk with an interpretivist theory of 
adjudication.  
Moreover, even if we agreed on contract law’s foundations, the very 
complexity of private law interactions, and the relevance of stability and reliance in 
their development, suggests that the simple legal doctrines and clear-cut rules 
generated by a formalist approach may deal with this complexity better than more 
ambitious approaches.229 We should not lose track of “the virtue of deciding many 
questions up front and across the board,”230 and of the advantages of using blunt and 
narrowing devices that cut off access to communicative features that, in other 
contexts, might be relevant.231  
This simplicity comes at a cost. Following legal rules and doctrines without 
consideration of their underlying purposes will sometimes result in morally sub-
                                                   
224 See SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES, supra note 48, at 229–30. 
225 Henry E. Smith, Modularity and Morality in the Law of Torts, 4 J. TORT L., no. 2, 
2011, at 29. 
226 Schwartz & Scott, Contract Interpretation Redux, supra note 27, at 930.  
227 See Alexander, supra note 35, at 551–52. 
228 Id. at 541. 
229 See Andrew S. Gold & Henry E. Smith, Sizing up Private Law, U. TORONTO L.J. 1, 
6–7 (2019).  
230 Henry E. Smith, Mind the Gap: The Indirect Relation Between Ends and Means in 
American Property Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 959, 963 (2009). 
231 Frederick Schauer, Statutory Construction and the Coordinating Function of Plain 
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optimal results—for instance, when the lack of a formality prevents the enforcement 
of an otherwise legitimate and jointly beneficial bargain. The benefits of formalism, 
however, may still outweigh its moral cost.232 More importantly, when the 
application of legal materials, literally interpreted and doctrinally constructed, is 
clearly inconsistent with any plausible rationale or instrumental value of contract 
law, then formalism provides a remedy that can preserve some of the benefits of 
rule-boundedness and decisional restriction, but still deal with these hard cases: legal 
principles.  
 
B.  Institutional Considerations 
 
Deciding on the best theory of adjudication depends on an assessment of 
institutional capacities.233 In this aspect, it is generally accepted that judges are ill-
equipped for the complex calculation of the consequences of their decisions.234 They 
lack relevant information, and their ability to foresee the consequences of their 
decisions is severely limited.235 Moreover, adjudicative decisions are focused on 
particular situations and their idiosyncratic characteristics, rather than on the 
aggregative analysis of all relevantly similar situations and their shared features. On 
the face of these facts, formalism may be the best pragmatic response to the 
institutional characteristics of judges and adjudication.236 As Williston once argued, 
courts, in contrast to legislatures, lack the appropriate means and perspective to 
engage in large-scale institutional design and social experimentation.237 
Similarly, Jonathan Morgan has convincingly argued that economic regulation 
is beyond the capacity of courts.238 This is particularly relevant from the perspective 
of efficiency. As is well-known, law and economics, despite its impressive 
development during the past fifty or sixty years, still lacks the resources to deliver 
univocal recommendations for contract law.239 If that is the case, then judges, who 
typically lack sophisticated economic training, are in a much worse position if we 
ask them to devise efficient decisions.240  
  
                                                   
232 See Alexander, supra note 35, at 551; see also Louis Kaplow, A Model of the 
Optimal Complexity of Legal Rules, 11 J.L., ECON. & ORG. 150, 151 (1995). 
233 VERMEULE, supra note 216, at 2. 
234 MACCORMICK, supra note 152, at 103–04. 
235 SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME, supra note 212, at 47. 
236 See Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation and Institutions, 101 MICH. 
L. REV. 885, 887–88 (2003). 
237 Movsesian, Rediscovering Williston, supra note 215, at 215. 
238 See MORGAN, supra note 27, at 121. 
239 See generally Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Contract Law under Conditions of Radical 
Judicial Error, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 749 (2000) [hereinafter Posner, Theory of Contract Law] 
(noting that courts may be “radically incompetent” when it comes to optimally enforcing 
contracts). 
240 MORGAN, supra note 27, at 121. 
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This phenomenon is not simply an issue of economic training, however. The 
factors contributing to courts’ institutional inadequacy to achieve socially optimal 
results are a consequence of the very way in which courts and adjudication are 
structured.241 Courts have limited empirical data regarding the possible effects of 
their decisions.242 The dispute is framed by the litigants’ submissions.243 And such 
disputes are not necessarily a representative sample of the whole cluster of cases to 
which the decision might be applicable.244 
Because of this, consequentialist reasoning about the attainment of contract 
law’s purposes—even if the identification of such purposes were easy and 
indisputable—should not be the central concern of adjudication, which seems ill-
equipped to deal with such considerations. Issues of legal interpretation are not just 
to be resolved at the substantive level—how should this legal text be interpreted?—
but, more importantly, are to be settled in institutional terms—how should this or 
that institution, with its abilities and limitations, apply this legal text?245 Thus, we 
shouldn’t be blind to institutional considerations. Of course, a full consideration of 
institutional competences is inevitably empirical and situated. But given a few 
structural features of adjudication, like the ones I have mentioned, it seems clear that 
institutional considerations present a forceful reason favoring formalism. Judges are 
appointed because of their legal training and knowledge;246 they should stick to do 
what they are trained to do. 
 
C.  Reduction of the Risks and Costs of Mistakes 
 
A third reason for formalism is given by the risk of judicial mistakes,247 since, 
as Schauer notes, when we allow decision-makers to consider every relevant factor 
to reach the best decision in the particular case, they might still fail.248 One need not 
endorse the view that courts are radically incompetent when it comes to enforcing 
contracts to accept this.249 It is just a matter of human fallibility, combined with some 
of the structural features of adjudication I already noted. 
The cost of adjudicative mistakes is a function of their number and 
magnitude.250 For the purposes of my argument, I will leave aside factual and 
empirical mistakes. Also, I will focus exclusively on hard cases, particularly cases  
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of Unacceptable Answer, which arguably present the best scenario for more open-
ended and less restrained decision-making procedures than formalism.  
Courts could be mistaken on at least three levels when deciding a hard 
contractual case. First, courts might be mistaken about the foundational goals of 
contract law; second, even if they identify the goals correctly, they might be 
mistaken about the supposed contradiction between such goals and the decision 
recommended by the formal application of legal rules; third, if the contradiction does 
exist, they might be mistaken about how to resolve it. 
At the first level, there is simply no agreement regarding the foundations, goals, 
and moral justifications underlying contract law. We still lack a generally accepted 
theory of contract.251 We also haven’t found a way to adjudicate among these views, 
partly because of diverging methodological commitments.252 This entails that (i) it 
is quite likely that a judge will be mistaken about the foundational goals of contract 
law, and that different judges will hold different and incompatible views about them 
(which means that any theory requiring judges to decide on the basis of those 
foundations will be unfit to be applied in a coordinated way); and (ii) since the 
identification of contract law’s foundations is contested, the identification of which 
applications are problematic and which are not will be tainted by the same 
disagreement. In terms of several central legal values, such as coherence, 
predictability, and treating like cases alike,253 this is a recipe for disaster. On the 
contrary, a formalist theory of adjudication may produce adequate results even for a 
diversity of foundational theories.254 It might be a sub-optimal alternative when 
compared to what any specific judge would consider as the best theory, but it is 
optimal as a coordinated solution among different judges. 
At a second level, even if we could agree on the foundations of contract law, 
the identification of which rule-applications are inconsistent with them is also 
subject to significant disagreement. At this second level, the interpretation and 
construction of the rule might be mistaken. There could also be a mistake in the 
identification of its application as inconsistent with the foundational goals of 
contract law. An easy example is the efficiency of contract remedies. Imagine we all 
agreed that contract law serves efficiency. Let us assume that a certain jurisdiction 
                                                   
251 Peter Benson, The Idea of a Public Basis of Justification for Contract, 33 OSGOODE 
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provides specific performance for the breach of a specific type of contract. Under a 
pragmatist approach, the rule should be set aside if in a given instance it would be, 
all-things-considered, inefficient to grant specific performance. However, the 
determination of the most efficient remedy—even at a general level, but particularly 
in the specific case—is an extremely complex task, and even legal economists who 
have focused a significant part of their academic careers on it have been unable to 
reach a clear conclusion.255 Pragmatism would generate significant risks of mistake 
if applied to remedial decisions. While a formalistic approach might end up strictly 
applying rules that also lead to inefficient outcomes, at least this would have the 
benefit of being a consistently predictable, and thus less costly, mistake—and one 
which legislatures and regulators, given their greater ability to gather systemic and 
aggregate information about large sets of contractual activities, might be better 
situated to correct. 
At a third level, even ignoring mistakes about foundational goals and about the 
inadequacy of rules, judges may be mistaken as to what the best solution would be. 
Again, contract remedies give a good example. Let us assume, again, that we all 
agree that efficiency is the sole foundational goal of contract law. Let us further 
assume that legal economists had a clear view about the inefficiency of specific 
performance, but that in a given jurisdiction it is the remedy prescribed by legal 
texts. A pragmatist theory of adjudication might recommend setting aside the 
specific performance remedy in such cases, based on its inconsistency with 
efficiency. However, the efficient remedy is again unclear. It might be expectation 
damages, reliance damages, restitution, or any proportion (say, 66% of expectation 
damages) or combination of them (say, 50% of expectation damages and 17% of 
reliance damages).256 The likelihood of a judge failing to determine the efficient 
remedy, again, is extremely high.  
This is even more problematic when there is simply no sound empirical 
evidence available for judges regarding the likely impact of legal rules and remedies. 
We thus need decision protocols that do not depend on this unattainable data.257 
Otherwise, if we direct judges to base their decisions on social consequences, we 
might end up inviting idiosyncratic or intuitive considerations to take the place of 
(unavailable) empirical findings.258 Instead, formalism’s decisional restriction 
advocates for a certain caution, narrowness in development, and self-limitation 
under uncertainty.259  
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D.  Predictability, Certainty, and the Protection of Legitimate Expectations 
 
Even if courts were perfect Herculean figures incapable of mistakes,260 
formalism still might be preferable because of its predictability, certainty, and the 
protection of legitimate expectations, all of which are crucial for contract law’s 
valuable effects. Whatever goals and social purposes underlie contract law, they are 
not achieved directly, but through the interaction of private individuals. In this 
aspect, for contract law to achieve its goals, people need to actually engage in 
contracting. At the same time, non-simultaneous exchange requires some form of 
assurance that performance will occur.261 Otherwise, contractual parties are stuck in 
a prisoner’s dilemma, in which each party’s incentives push them to defect rather 
than to cooperate.262 In order to avoid this dilemma, contract enforcement gives 
assurance with regards to the future conduct of contractual parties, deterring 
opportunistic behavior.263  
For formal contract enforcement to achieve such goals, however, it must be 
certain and predictable. This is particularly true for long-term contractual 
investments in developed economies and complex markets,264 which require a high 
degree of formality. 
Formal and general legal concepts, as Williston argued a long time ago, 
promote predictability in contractual relationships, while uncertainty is costly, 
particularly since the legal system should be able to determine rights and obligations 
without resorting to litigation.265 Predictable and clear-cut rules achieve such 
delineation without the costs of a more tailored approach. Indeed, for the recipients 
of rules, more information is not necessarily better.266 On the contrary, they need to 
navigate the complexity of their private interactions, and for such purpose clear-cut 
rules may be a crucial mechanism.267 This is particularly true in contract law, in 
which predictability about future behavior is essential. A coherent and predictable 
body of law allows individuals to plan with confidence, and to settle their disputes 
without the need to recur to litigation.268  
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Moreover, when serious legal rules are in place and they are applicable, judges 
can expect parties to have followed those rules for guidance.269 In the case of contract 
law, this means that judges who want to decide predictably ought to apply the rules 
as they were found by the parties when planning their affairs and executing their 
contracts. Uncertainty may limit the value of contractual instruments as planning 
devices, as has been attested by the growing critical literature on the Uniform 
Commercial Code’s incorporation strategy.270 On the other hand, through its use of 
doctrinal concepts and principles, a formalist approach achieves an equilibrium 
between development and stability. 
 
E.  Dealing with Value Pluralism 
 
Another reason for formalism in adjudication is given by foundational value 
pluralism. Whatever one might say about the normative foundations of contract law, 
and even if pluralism is not the correct account of such foundations, as a matter of 
descriptive sociology the fact of theoretical pluralism—of people holding diverse, 
conflicting, and potentially incommensurable values—in contract theory is. 
Despite these conflicting values, judges must decide disputes. One path towards 
those decisions could be to try to achieve the best possible judgment by combining 
and weighing competing principles, trying to strike the right balance. But this might 
lead to ad hoc decisions and inconsistency. One reasonable way to avoid ad hoc 
decisions and inconsistency, even if foundations are plural or at least contested, is to 
adopt a formalistic approach to adjudication that refuses to take into consideration 
such foundations. Formalism avoids these disagreements by refusing to adjudicate 
them in order to decide contractual disputes, resorting to formal rules rather than to 
foundational principles.271  
However, one could acknowledge pluralism and claim, nevertheless, that 
adjudication should not ignore underlying values. For instance, Aditi Bagchi has 
recently defended a view of contract as imperfect procedural justice, according to 
which judges should constantly refer to the normative principles underlying contract 
law.272 Bagchi’s claim is that the justification of contract law should inform 
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adjudication,273 because contracting is an imperfect means to achieve normative 
ends, a mechanism that normally reaches those ends but may nevertheless fail to do 
so. Bagchi argues that pluralism and this view of imperfect procedural justice go 
easily together, because the odds that a specific set of rules will consistently serve 
several distinct goals are low.274 
For Bagchi, because contractual exchange is a useful yet imperfect mechanism 
for achieving valuable social goals,275 contract law should be understood and 
interpreted in terms of those ends. Judges should use evaluative considerations in 
the very course of applying the rules of contract law.276 For her, this is in some sense 
inevitable, since legal doctrines and rules do not apply themselves, and are 
indeterminate regarding case outcomes.277 Values do not simply justify contract law. 
They should be invoked and pursued in its everyday operation.278 
One possibility Bagchi doesn’t consider is that it might be the case that respect 
for the values justifying contract law precisely requires not trying to achieve those 
values when adjudicating disputes. For instance, if one thinks that personal 
autonomy and efficiency are values underlying contract law, a view which is at least 
plausible, we might have good reasons for judges not to read too much of those 
normative commitments into authoritative legal texts. If efficiency and autonomy 
have anything to do with allowing parties to satisfy their preferences, then a theory 
of adjudication that prevents judges from trying to actively achieve efficiency and 
autonomy seems at least compelling.279 Respect for autonomy and efficiency might 
require a certain deference for parties’ own judgments.  
Moreover, the claim that legal materials are indeterminate seems to be an 
exaggeration. Indeed, this is untrue at least for judges working in present-day 
jurisdictions, given the fact that most of the legal texts for contract law are part of a 
larger and settled systematic web of doctrines and legal principles. If one 
understands legal norms as including this systemic web—as one should—then the 
indeterminacy claim seems much less attractive. Moreover, we might devise 
mechanisms, such as internal mid-level principles, that allow us to deal with 
indeterminacy when we encounter it, without resorting to foundational values. This, 
again, might combine the benefits of serious rules with the normative weight of 
foundational values, without falling into unpredictability.  
At a deeper level, whatever one can say about the foundations of contract law, 
there is today simply no consensus about them. Seeing contract as an imperfect 
procedural mechanism might make sense in a world where we agreed on contract’s 
foundations. However, in our world, in which we lack such a consensus, things 
might work better, to use Rawls’s framework, if we see contract as a case of pure 
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procedural justice, that is, a case where “there is no independent criterion for the 
right result,”280 not because we think there is no right result, but because, given the 
fact of theoretical disagreement, the right result never appears in propria persona, 
but always “in the form of somebody’s controversial belief.”281 
Against this backdrop, formalism allows for incompletely theorized agreements 
between people that differ starkly on fundamental values.282 This is extremely 
relevant, because a theory of adjudication must be susceptible of application by a 
diversity of courts. From this perspective, theories of adjudication solve 
coordination problems between adjudicators. As a coordinating solution, formalism 
avoids the pitfalls of a “theoretically optimizing but likely self-defeating search for 
first-best solutions by multiple decisionmakers with different goals and different 
perspectives.”283 
 
F.  The Rule of Contract Law and Its Instrumentality: Autonomy and Efficiency 
 
A long tradition sees the rule of law as an instrumental virtue of law, conformity 
to which is morally required because it is necessary to allow law to perform its 
functions.284 In this part, I will analyze formalism’s instrumental value in terms of 
efficiency and personal autonomy, two values that might plausibly underlie contract 
law. Regarding these values, formalism presents at least one significant advantage 
over other views: it allows parties to set the terms of their interaction, to know where 
they stand, and to avoid being subject to the wide range of possible decisions that a 
less constrained judge might take.285  
The connection between stable rules and personal autonomy makes intuitive 
sense. The connection was aptly drawn in Hayek’s discussion of the rule of law, 
according to which obedience to general, abstract and prospective rules is not 
subjection to someone else’s will.286 Hayek, in my view, was mistaken when he 
assumed that the resulting freedom obtained simply as a consequence of the structure 
of legal rules. Instead, freedom obtains as a consequence of the adjudicating 
institutions’ attitude towards those norms. Formalism provides a way in which such 
an attitude can be fostered. But Hayek’s insight about the connection between legal 
formality and personal freedom is fundamental. Just as important is Hayek’s view 
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of contract as one of the legal instruments “that the law supplies to the individual to 
shape his own position.”287 This observation remains true only if the individual’s 
power to shape his own position is not affected by ex post adjustments to the 
applicable legal rules governing such power. If that is the case, then contract law can 
effectively work towards securing personal autonomy by establishing a general 
framework under which individuals are free to pursue their own projects and 
desires.288 Formal contract law provides stability and assurance to interpersonal 
relationships, and this allows individuals to “choose styles and forms of life, to fix 
long-term goals and effectively direct one’s life towards them.”289  
The contribution of formalism to markets and economic efficiency is also easy 
to see. The case, again, is made by Hayek. As he argues, allowing individuals to rely 
on stable legal frameworks within which they may plan their activities also enables 
them “to make the fullest use” of their knowledge.290 Under a formalist approach, 
the rules of contract law can thus work as what Sunstein calls privately adaptable 
rules, which allocate initial entitlements but maximize private flexibility and 
adaptation in achieving ultimate outcomes, minimizing information costs for 
governments.291 Again, we must recall that, whatever goal contract law achieves, it 
does so through the contractual activities of individuals.  
From the perspective of efficiency, moreover, contract law should help parties 
maximize their joint gains.292 In recent economic contract theory, Schwartz and 
Scott have convincingly argued that there are good efficiency reasons, at least at the 
level of contracts between sophisticated parties, for a generally formalistic approach, 
combining interpretive approaches such as plain meaning, a hard parol evidence 
rule, and the strict enforcement of merger clauses,293 along with a narrow evidentiary 
basis.294 This is what sophisticated parties, focused on maximizing their joint gains, 
would prefer.  
Although there is not nearly enough empirical evidence to conclusively confirm 
Schwartz’s and Scott’s theory, there is some empirical evidence available. Lisa 
Bernstein has shown in her studies, for instance, that commercial parties in trust-
based settings, such as the cotton industry and the New York diamond market, prefer 
formalistic adjudication.295 At a wider level, various empirical studies have shown 
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that parties to international transactions prefer English, New York, and Swiss law, 
three relatively formalistic systems of contract law.296 Within the United States, 
empirical evidence shows that New York law is the dominant legal framework 
chosen by public companies, and that New York is also the preferred forum.297 In 
contrast, few parties choose California, an economically significant State with a 
contextualist and less formalistic approach to contract adjudication.298 Moreover, as 
any practicing transactional lawyer can attest, commercial parties often ask courts, 
in their contracts, to ignore prior negotiations, oral discussions, and course of 
conduct, and to limit their analysis to the ‘four corners’ of the contract.299 Assuming 
that parties want to maximize their joint gains, and considering that these clauses are 
negotiated ex ante, such clauses “likely represent efforts by the contracting parties 
to maximize the joint value of the undertaking.”300 This means: formalistic devices 
increase the joint value of contractual transactions and are thus more efficient. 
 
VIII.  CONCLUSION 
 
There is a strong general case to make for what I have called formalism as the 
right approach to the adjudication of contractual disputes. The claim is strongest 
when formalism is compared to pragmatism. In this part, however, I make some 
closing suggestions as to why formalism might be generally preferable when 
compared to other possible theories as well (such as interpretivism and 
conventionalism), admitting, again, that these arguments are general, and would 
need to be supplemented with further empirical evidence.  
In hard cases, conventionalism’s response, as we have seen, is discretion. 
Admittedly, Raz and others have argued that discretion is still constrained by law.301 
But they never explain just how those constraints work. Instead, formalism argues 
for internal, doctrinal, mid-level principles. Adjudicating these cases through 
internal principles rather than resorting to discretion is normatively preferable for 
two reasons. The first is the problem of human fallibility and the risks of mistakes 
analyzed above, especially since we are dealing with power-conferring social 
institutions (whose use by individuals cannot be controlled nor predicted). The 
second reason is given by the protection of the practice of contracting and the 
expectations fostered by it; any deviation from the rules, even when their application 
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could lead to sub-optimal results, can affect the stability of expectations and the 
practice of contracting. Again, this does not mean that judges should deny or ignore 
the existence of hard cases. But it does counsel for a more formalistic approach 
towards these situations than engaging in all-things-considered discretional 
decisions, or in the indeterminately constrained discretion proposed by 
conventionalism. 
What about interpretivism’s Herculean principles? It might seem that, unlike 
pragmatism and conventionalism, interpretivism provides a good mechanism for 
dealing with hard cases. However, the empirical demandingness of all-things-
considered calculations and pragmatic consequentialist considerations finds a 
parallel in the normative demandingness of the task that Dworkin entrusts to 
adjudicators.302 Hercules is Hercules precisely because he is unlike any judge we 
know of. Judges are constrained by time and resources, and might not be able to 
engage with large issues of political morality. Moreover, both personal autonomy 
and social equality might be hurt by Herculean judges, willing to engage into deeply 
contested and uncertain issues of political morality in order to solve contractual 
disputes. In these circumstances, the best theory of adjudication might be one that 
recommends modesty and decisions based on less abstract principles operating at a 
lower level of generality.303 
In his early critique of Hartian positivism, Dworkin expressed his 
dissatisfaction with what he saw as Hart’s all too quick embrace of discretion in 
cases that went beyond the core of pre-existing legal rules, which also led to the 
admission that judges decide cases by making retroactive law.304 However, the 
problem with Dworkinian principles is that they are unable to avoid the problem of 
ex post facto lawmaking. Under formalism, when judges recognize new rights, 
remedies, or defenses by applying a principle, they do so by connecting their 
innovation to already existing authoritative legal materials that are part of the 
relevant legal tradition.305 They attempt to show that, in an important sense, they are 
part of those materials, rightly understood.306 While Dworkin incorporates attempts 
to achieve something similar through the desideratum that principles should fit the 
legal materials,307 his principles are still broad principles of political morality: 
“principles of justice, fairness, and procedural due process.”308 Interpretivism asks 
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the judge to decide hard cases by testing whether her interpretation could form part 
of a coherent political theory,309 and shows the legal record as the morally best it can 
be.310 In contrast, formalism’s legal principles are mid-level. They operate at a lower 
level of abstraction than principles of substantive political morality. They are 
doctrinal, not political. They are elaborations of contract doctrine, conceptual 
devices built and developed by the legal tradition—and, particularly, by prior 
scholars, judges, and jurists. Turning Dworkin’s metaphor upside down, one could 
thus say: formalism advocates for a catholic, rather than a protestant, jurisprudence. 
With this, I mean that while Dworkinian principles are substantive principles of 
political morality that “each citizen has a responsibility to identify,”311 formalist 
legal principles are doctrinal, technical, and thus are not directly identified by private 
citizens, but rather reach those citizens as mediated by an authoritative legal 
tradition. As such, they avoid, in a way in which Dworkinian principles do not, 
retroactive law-making. 
Formalism does not suggest that judges should completely ignore the issue of 
the political and moral foundations of contract law. After all, the whole basis of the 
theory of adjudication is that it best achieves contract law’s foundational goals. But 
they should address cases modestly, either by applying the limitedly enriched 
semantic content of legal texts and resorting to their settled doctrinal construction, 
or, when this is not possible, by applying mid-level legal doctrinal principles. 
Finally, since formalism avoids grand changes and reorientations of prior 
jurisprudence, it also decreases the magnitude and costs of mistakes when they 
happen.312 In this, formalism and its insistence on mid-level principles are more 
consistent with rule of law values like predictability than are abstract Dworkinian 
principles.313 Mid-level principles are less unpredictable than large-scale 
foundational ones, and in their consistent and disciplined application they decrease 
legal indeterminacy.314 Mid-level principles are more consistent, in the end, with all 
the values traditionally associated with the rule of law, than Dworkinian principles 
of substantive political morality. While we can and do disagree about whether 
freedom or social equality are more important, or about whether a particular rule 
serves equality or hinders it, it is harder to disagree about the principle of good faith. 
Thus, resolving disputes on the basis of principles like the latter achieves greater 
predictability than resolving them on the basis of grand and abstract political values.  
For these reasons, there is a strong general case in favor of a formalist approach 
to contract law adjudication. While a final assessment of the comparative advantages 
of different theories of adjudication turns on empirical facts, I have argued that, in 
the absence of such evidence, we should resist the call for more open-ended, 
particularistic, or politically ambitious theories. Formalism, with its decisional 
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restriction, incremental development, and rule-bound character, is at least prima 
facie preferable—which means that instrumentalists and non-instrumentalists might 
end up agreeing, to some extent, at the level of adjudication. 
